Monthly Analysis of Russian Shahed 136 Deployment Against Ukraine JUNE 2026

June 2026 marked a clear break from the rapid growth pattern observed from January through May. That growth pattern was described in the April and May updates, which showed the transition from record monthly launch volumes to sustained system-level pressure.[1] According to Ukrainian Air Force reporting compiled for this assessment, Russia launched 5,749 Shahed-type UAVs, including decoys, during June.[2] This was a sharp reduction from the May record of 8,161 UAVs, and also below the March and April levels. The average daily launch rate fell from 263 total UAVs[3] in May to 192 in June. Estimated Shahed/Geran strike UAV launches fell from approximately 5,181 in May to 3,679 in June, or from about 167 to 123 Shahed/Geran UAVs per day (see Table 1, Figure 1, and Figure 4).

At the same time, the reduction in launch volume did not mean a proportional reduction in strike effect. The overall hit rate increased from 6.65 percent in May to 8.07 percent in June, while the hit rate relative to estimated Shahed/Geran launches increased from about 10.48 percent to 12.61 percent (see Table 1 and Figures 5a-b). These figures remain low compared with much of 2025 and early 2026, but they show that June was not simply a month of weaker attacks. It was a month of fewer UAVs, but somewhat more effective UAV employment.

The number and size of mass attacks declined. In May, four daily attack periods involved 600 or more Shahed-type UAVs, including the record May 13-14 sequence (see the May-July daily pattern in Figure 2b, and the longer daily context in Figure 2a). In June, only two daily attack periods crossed the 600-UAV threshold: June 2, with 656 UAVs, and June 15, with 611 UAVs (see Table 2 and Figure 2b). All other June attacks were substantially smaller. This became especially visible after June 12: apart from the June 15 mass attack, all daily totals through the end of the month remained below 240 UAVs, with many days closer to or below 150 UAVs.

The spacing between mass attacks also increased. Taking the major labeled attack periods in Figure 2b, the gaps widened from the May 13-14 sequence to May 18 (four days if counted from May 14, or five days if counted from May 13), then to six days between May 18 and May 24, nine days between May 24 and June 2, 13 days between June 2 and June 15, and 17 days between June 15 and July 2. This progression suggests that, after the intense May period, Russia either needed or chose longer accumulation intervals before assembling large UAV strike packages.

The data alone do not prove a decline in Russian production. A safer interpretation is that June may reflect a combination of factors: stockpile management after the unusually heavy May expenditure, changes in targeting priorities, a temporary shift toward missile-heavy combined attacks, operational regrouping, production and supply-chain constraints. However, the pattern is consistent with the possibility that Russia faced a temporary bottleneck in one or more critical inputs - electronics, engines, navigation components, communications modules, or supply/logistics flows from China and third-country intermediaries.

Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian defense-industry and electronics-related facilities during June add another possible explanation, although the timing and scale of their effect on Shahed/Geran production cannot yet be confirmed. The June trend should therefore be treated as an early warning indicator, not as conclusive evidence of a sustained production decline. The mass attacks on July 2 and July 6 show that Russia retained the capacity to assemble large, combined strike packages after a period of reduced launch tempo.

Mass Attacks Declined, and Operational Pauses Increased

June did not repeat the extreme tempo of May. The two largest June attacks were June 2 and June 15, both of which were combined missile-UAV strikes centered on Kyiv and other major urban or infrastructure targets. On June 2, Russia launched 656 Shahed-type UAVs as part of a 729 combined strike package. On June 15, 611 UAVs were launched as part of a 681 combined strike package. These were the only two June attacks above the 600-UAV threshold (see Table 2, Figure 2b, and the attack maps in Figure 3). No June attack reached the scale of the May 13-14 sequence, and no other June attack came close to the 600-UAV level.

The post-June 12 pattern is particularly important. During the fourteen-day period from May 29 through June 11, the average number of daily UAV launches was 259.7, or approximately 260 UAVs per day. During the following period from June 12 through June 30, the average dropped to 150.7, or approximately 151 UAVs per day. This represents a decline of about 109 UAVs per day, or roughly 42 percent (see Figure 2b). After June 12, Russia continued daily or near-daily UAV attacks, but outside the June 15 mass attack, the numbers were mostly moderate and never exceeded 239 UAVs in a single day (see Table 2).

The longer pause before the next major attacks, especially the 17-day interval from June 15 to July 2, may indicate that Russia needed more time to accumulate UAVs and missiles for combined strike packages. It may also indicate that Russian planners chose to conserve drones for higher-value attacks rather than sustain the May rhythm of repeated large waves. The July 2 attack therefore does not contradict the June slowdown; rather, it suggests that Russia retained the ability to assemble large packages, but the interval required before doing so became noticeably longer.

• all Shahed-type UAVs, including Shahed/Geran strike UAVs, Italmas (BM‑35), Garpiya A1, Gerbera, and other decoy or auxiliary UAVs;
• Shahed/Geran strike UAVs produced exclusively in Alabuga, which are specifically designated in official reports as “around/over XXX of them being ‘Shaheds’”;
• other Shahed-type UAVs, including Italmas (BM‑35), Garpiya A1, Gerbera, and various decoy UAVs referenced in official Ukrainian reporting.

Official Ukrainian reporting combines kinetically destroyed UAVs and UAVs neutralized through electronic warfare or other suppression methods under the category 'shot down/suppressed.' This report follows the official reporting language and treats this category as the number of UAVs prevented from reaching intended targets.

After early May 2026, Ukrainian official reports no longer consistently provided a separate number of Shahed/Geran strike UAVs within the total number of Shahed-type UAVs. For June, the Shahed/Geran number is therefore estimated using the 2026 trend, under which approximately 64 percent of total Shahed-type UAV launches were assessed to be Shahed/Geran strike UAVs. This approach is consistent with the methodology used in the May report and is reflected in the June estimates in Table 1, Table 2, and Figure 4.

Official Ukrainian Air Force reporting generally covers the period from approximately 6:00 PM on the previous day until 08:00-09:00 AM on the reporting day. Because Russia has increasingly conducted daytime UAV attacks, monthly totals based on official morning reports may underestimate the actual number of UAVs launched. In June, however, the available official reports repeatedly stated that no separate daytime-cycle report had been published, so the figures here should be understood as conservative.

The June reduction in launches is the most important analytical question in this report. From January through May 2026, the trend pointed toward rapid growth in Russian UAV employment, with May setting a new monthly record. June interrupted that trend. The fall from 8,161 total UAVs in May to 5,749 in June represents a reduction of 2,412 UAVs, or about 30 percent (see Table 1 and Figure 1). The change is even clearer throughout the month: daily launches averaged about 260 UAVs from May 29 through June 11, but only about 151 UAVs from June 12 through June 30 (see Figure 2b).

Several explanations are possible. First, Russia may have expended unusually large stocks in May and then needed to rebuild inventories. Second, the June pattern may reflect deliberate operational planning: fewer mass waves, more selective attacks, and greater reliance on combined packages that included ballistic and cruise missiles. Third, production may have faced a temporary bottleneck caused by Ukrainian strikes, component shortages, transport delays, or payment and procurement problems in supply chains linked to China or third-country intermediaries.

Additional Expert View: Tactical Reorientation

An additional interpretation was offered by Serhii Flash, a well-known Ukrainian electronic warfare specialist and advisor to Ukraine's Minister of Defense. In his view, the reduction in overall Shahed launches should not necessarily be read as evidence of a technical or economic bottleneck on the Russian side. He argues that once Ukraine began intercepting roughly 92-96 percent of gasoline-powered Shaheds during attacks on the deep rear, their use for such missions became less efficient. As a result, Russia is increasingly shifting deep-rear attacks toward jet-powered Shahed variants, while continuing to use gasoline-powered Shaheds against border regions and frontline-adjacent cities. Most importantly for interpreting the June decline, Flash supposes that part of Russian production is now being reoriented toward serial manufacturing of jet-powered Shaheds.[1]

Flash also notes that proximity to the border allows Russia to make broader use of radio control through mesh modems, reducing the effectiveness of suppressing satellite navigation in those specific scenarios. He therefore sees the current period as a possible transition from mass attacks toward more selective strikes: important targets are selected after multi-stage reconnaissance; Ukrainian EW, radar, and air-defense lines are probed; corridors around interceptors are tested; routes are built at different altitudes and speeds; and Shahed "Seeker" variants with target-acquisition capability are reportedly used. This assessment does not exclude production or supply-chain constraints, but it provides an important tactical explanation for why lower aggregate launch numbers could coincide with more selective and somewhat more effective UAV employment.

[1] Serhii Flash, public Facebook post, https://www.facebook.com/share/p/18uLx5FvWX/

Open-source reporting during June is consistent with the possibility of pressure on Russia's defense-industrial base. Ukraine reportedly struck VNIIR-Progress in Cheboksary, described in reporting as a plant producing components for Russian drones, and later struck a Voronezh electronics plant linked by Ukrainian officials to Russian missile production.[4][5] Other reporting described an expanded Ukrainian campaign against Russian defense-industry facilities during June.[6] These strikes do not by themselves prove a direct effect on Shahed/Geran production, but they strengthen the case for monitoring whether the June reduction continues in later months.

Sanctions pressure also remains relevant, but the effect is difficult to measure. New European sanctions discussions in early July reportedly focused on entities and individuals involved in Shahed/Geran drone component production.[7] For this reason, sanctions may be part of the explanation, but it would be premature to treat them as the dominant cause of the June decline.

The July 2 and July 6 attacks are a caution against assuming that Russia lost the ability to conduct mass attacks.[8] Instead, they suggest that Russia can still assemble large strike packages, but may now require longer intervals between them, or may be choosing to concentrate UAVs for specific political or operational effects. The increase in the gaps between mass attacks from four to six days in mid-May to 9, 13, and then 17 days by early July is therefore one of the most important operational indicators to watch in the next reporting period (see Figure 2b).

Jet-Powered Geran-3/Geran-4 and Other Technical Trends

June reports repeatedly mentioned Shahed-type UAVs 'including jet-powered ones.' This continued the May trend, but the role of jet-powered variants appears to be evolving. By early July, Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat stated that Russia was using jet-powered drones virtually around the clock together with conventional kamikaze drones, and that these faster systems can reach roughly 500 km/h.[9] Their higher speed reduces the engagement window for mobile fire groups and may force Ukraine to use more capable interceptors or missile systems in some cases.

At the same time, jet-powered variants still appear to be used as a small share of the overall Shahed-type campaign. Their most important current role may be tactical and psychological: complicating air-defense planning, testing new profiles, and creating uncertainty in mixed formations that also include conventional Shahed/Geran UAVs, Gerbera, Italmas, Banderol, and Parody decoys.

The growing Ukrainian use of interceptor drones remains one of the key defensive adaptations. In June, open-source reporting credited Ukrainian Sting interceptors with the destruction of more than 3,000 Shahed and Gerbera loitering munitions in May.[10] This trend helps explain why overall Russian UAV strike effectiveness remains low even when launch volumes are high (see Figures 5a-b).

June showed a moderate rebound in strike effectiveness compared with May. The overall hit rate increased to 8.07 percent of total Shahed-type launches, compared with 6.65 percent in May. Relative to estimated Shahed/Geran launches, the hit rate rose to 12.61 percent from 10.48 percent in May (see Table 1 and Figures 5a-b).

The daily June data show that the highest hit rates did not occur during the largest attacks (see Table 2 and Figure 5b). The June 2 attack involved 656 UAVs but produced a 5.03 percent hit rate relative to total launches. The June 15 attack involved 611 UAVs and produced a 4.42 percent hit rate. By contrast, June 29 involved only 108 UAVs but produced a 23.15 percent hit rate. This reinforces the pattern observed in earlier reports: larger UAV packages do not automatically produce proportionally higher strike success, and in many cases the largest waves have relatively low penetration rates.

Even with low percentage effectiveness, the strategic value of hits remains significant. A small number of successful UAV strikes can damage energy infrastructure, air-defense support facilities, logistics nodes, fuel infrastructure, industrial sites, or residential areas. The operational purpose of the Shahed campaign therefore remains broader than the hit ratio alone: it is also designed to exhaust defenses, trigger alerts, support missile attacks, and maintain constant pressure on the Ukrainian population and economy.

• Reduced monthly volume after May peak. June was the first month in 2026 to show a major decline after the January-May upward trend. The decline was visible both in total Shahed-type launches and in estimated Shahed/Geran launches (see Table 1, Figure 1, and Figure 4).
• Fewer and smaller mass attacks. Only two June days exceeded 600 UAVs: June 2, with 656 UAVs, and June 15, with 611 UAVs. All other June attacks were significantly smaller. After June 12, excluding the June 15 mass attack, the largest daily total was 239 UAVs on June 18 (see Table 2 and Figure 2b).
• Continued mixed strike packages. Russia continued to use Shahed/Geran UAVs together with Gerbera, Italmas, Banderol, Parody decoys, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and guided missiles. The purpose remains to fragment Ukrainian defensive responses and create opportunities for selected missiles or UAVs to penetrate.
• Higher relative effectiveness despite lower volume. The June hit rate increased compared with May. This may reflect more selective targeting, shorter or more favorable routes, or simply statistical variation caused by fewer extremely large attacks with very low penetration rates (see Table 1 and Figures 5a-b).
• Longer accumulation intervals. The gaps between major attacks increased from the May 13-14 sequence to May 18, May 24, June 2, June 15, and July 2: roughly 4/5, 6, 9, 13, and 17 days, respectively. This suggests that Russia may have needed longer intervals to assemble large, combined strike packages or deliberately chose to preserve UAVs for attacks with stronger political and psychological impact (see Figure 2b).
• Growing importance of jet-powered UAVs and interceptor drones. Jet-powered Shahed/Geran variants complicate Ukrainian interception, but Ukrainian interceptor drones continue to offset part of Russia’s quantitative advantage and are likely one of the main reasons Russian UAV effectiveness remains limited.

The June data suggest a more ambiguous situation than in May. May clearly pointed to Russia's ability to scale UAV operations to record levels. June points instead to a temporary pullback, a changed rhythm, or a production and supply-chain constraint (see Table 1 and Figure 1). The most responsible assessment is that Russia's UAV campaign remains large and dangerous, but its growth may not be linear.

If the June decline continues in July and August, it would support the hypothesis that Russia has encountered a bottleneck in production, components, engines, logistics, or financing. If, however, July returns to May-level volumes, June should be interpreted mainly as a stockpile and planning interval between major strike cycles. The first week of July already suggests that Russia retained the ability to launch large, combined attacks, although the spacing between such attacks remains important.

A critical uncertainty is the sustainability of Russia's foreign-component supply chain. Recovered UAVs continue to demonstrate dependence on foreign electronics, navigation components, communications modules, and other technologies. China-linked procurement networks and third-country intermediaries remain central to this problem.[11] Any disruption in a narrow set of components could produce a visible reduction in completed UAVs even if airframes and assembly capacity remain available.

June 2026 marked a significant reduction in Russian Shahed-type UAV launches compared with the May record. Total launches fell by about 30 percent, and estimated Shahed/Geran launches also fell substantially (see Table 1, Figure 1, and Figure 4).

Despite the reduction in volume, strike effectiveness increased compared with May. This suggests that Russia used fewer UAVs but achieved a somewhat higher rate of successful hits (see Table 1 and Figures 5a-b).

Mass attacks were less frequent and smaller than in May. In June, only June 2 and June 15 crossed the 600-UAV threshold, while all other attacks were significantly smaller, especially after June 12 (see Table 2 and Figure 2b).

The interval between mass attacks increased. The gap widened from only four to six days between May 13-14, May 18, and May 24 attacks to nine days between May 24 and June 2, 13 days between June 2 and June 15, and 17 days between June 15 and July 2 (see Figure 2b). This may indicate stockpile management, operational regrouping, or temporary production and supply constraints.

The June data are consistent with, but do not prove, a temporary reduction in Russian UAV production or availability. Possible causes include Ukrainian strikes on defense-industrial and electronics facilities, shortages of critical components, delays in Chinese-linked supply chains, payment or procurement disruptions, or the cumulative effect of sanctions and enforcement measures.

The early July mass attacks show that Russia retained the ability to assemble large, combined strike packages. Therefore, the June trend should be treated as an important warning signal rather than a definitive turning point.

The central question for the coming months is whether June was a temporary pause after May's extreme expenditure or the first sign that Russia's Shahed/Geran production and supply chain are becoming less stable.

Table 1.  Detailed statistics of the launches, interceptions and hits of the total Shahed-type UAVs 
and Shahed (Geran)-strike UAVs in January 2025 through June 2026.

Figure 1. Monthly launches of the Shahed-type UAVs (total and specifically Shahed/Geran-strike UAVs) vs Hits from January 2025 through June 2026.

Figure 2a. Statistics of the daily launches of the Shahed-type UAVs in August 2024 through June 2026.

Figure 2b. Statistics of the daily launches of the Shahed-type UAVs in May 2026 through July 6, 2026.

Figure 3.  The maps show combined attacks that ran on June 1-2 and June 14-15, 2026.

(Source: https://t.me/hqmapukr/76, https://t.me/hqmapukr/78)

Figure 4. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed/Geran strike UAVs in September 2025 through June 2026.

Figure 5a. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the total Shahed-type UAVs in January 2025 through June 2026.

Figure 5b. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the Shahed/Geran strike UAVs in January 2026 through June 2026.

Table 2. Daily statistics on the number of launches, hits, and hit effectiveness for all Shahed-type UAVs, as well as specifically for Shahed (Geran) strike UAVs, in June 2026.

[2] Official Ukrainian Air Force daily reports compiled in Russian strikes in Ukraine (2026) (June).docx; official Ukrainian Air Force channels include https://t.me/kpszsu and https://www.facebook.com/kpszsu.

[3] Total Shahed-type UAV launches also included Italmas (BM‑35), Garpiya A1, Gerbera, and other decoy UAVs

[4] The Guardian, "Ukraine war briefing: Flamingo missiles hit more far-flung Russian targets," June 11, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/11/ukraine-war-briefing-flamingo-missiles-hit-more-far-flung-russian-targets.

[5] Reuters, "Ukraine says it struck Russian missile electronics plant, governor says five dead," June 22, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-it-struck-russian-missile-electronics-plant-2026-06-22/; Al Jazeera, "Ukraine says it hit missile electronics plant in western Russia," June 22, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/22/ukraine-says-it-hit-missile-electronics-plant-in-western-russia.

[6] United24 Media, "Ukraine Launches Record Wave of Strikes on Russia's Defense Industry in June," June 28, 2026, https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/ukraine-launches-record-wave-of-strikes-on-russias-defense-industry-in-june-20234; United24 Media, "11 Refineries, 8 Defense Plants, Space Comms Centers: Ukraine Reveals Scale of June Deep-Strike Campaign," July 1, 2026, https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/11-refineries-8-defense-plants-space-comms-centers-ukraine-reveals-scale-of-june-deep-strike-campaign-20339.

[7] Euronews, "EU targets Russian drone-makers with sanctions following massive strikes on Kyiv," July 2, 2026, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/07/02/eu-targets-russian-drone-makers-with-sanctions-following-massive-strikes-on-kyiv; European Pravda, "New EU sanctions to target six individuals involved in Russian drone production," July 2, 2026, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/2/7240849/.

[8] Ukrainska Pravda, "Russia launches 570 drones and missiles at Ukraine, air defence intercepts 524 targets," July 2, 2026, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/02/8042035/; Ukrainska Pravda, "Air Force on Russia's overnight attack: 363 aerial assets downed, 29 ballistic missiles and 18 drone hits recorded," July 6, 2026, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/06/8042555/.

[9] Ukrainska Pravda, "Russia steps up use of jet-powered drones beyond reach of mobile fire groups," July 2, 2026, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/02/8042060/.

[10] Ukrainska Pravda, "Ukrainian-made Sting interceptors shot down over 3,000 Russian Shaheds and Gerberas in May," June 11, 2026, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/11/8038825/.

[11] United24 Media, "How China Evades Sanctions to Arm Russian Drones," May 8, 2026, https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/chinese-firm-smuggles-military-drone-components-to-russia-as-tractor-parts-18614; United24 Media, "Chinese Firms Keep Drone Parts Flowing to Russia and Iran Despite Sanctions, WSJ Finds," May 6, 2026, https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/chinese-firms-keep-drone-parts-flowing-to-russia-and-iran-despite-sanctions-wsj-finds-18511.

MAY 2026

May 2026 marked a new peak in the scale of Russian Shahed-type UAV operations against Ukraine. According to Ukrainian Air Force reporting [1], over the course of the month, Russia launched a total of 8,161 Shahed-type UAVs (including decoys), of which an estimated 5,181 were Shahed/Geran strike UAVs produced at the Alabuga facility. The average launch rate reached 263 total UAVs[2] (167 Shahed/Geran) daily, exceeding the previous records established in March and April 2026 (see Table 1, Figure 1).

The most significant development was not simply the increase in launch volume. Despite record numbers of UAVs being employed, the effectiveness of the attacks continued to decline. The overall hit rate fell to approximately 6.65 percent of total Shahed-type launches and roughly 10.48 percent of estimated Shahed/Geran launches. These were among the lowest effectiveness levels observed since the large-scale expansion of Russian UAV operations began.

The data suggest that Russia is increasingly compensating for declining strike efficiency through larger attack packages. This trend indicates that the campaign is designed not only to damage specific targets but also to impose sustained psychological pressure on the civilian population, disrupt economic activity, exhaust Ukrainian air-defense resources, and create favorable conditions for missile strikes.

Mass Attacks Continue, but Fewer 24-Hour Strike Cycles

May continued the trend of large-scale attacks. Four major attack periods involved more than 600 UAVs: May 1, May 13, May 14, and May 24 (see Figures 2a-b), as follows:

• May 1 – 619 total UAVs (390 Shahed/Geran strike UAVs);
• May 13 – 892 total UAVs (approximately 571 Shahed/Geran strike UAVs);
• May 14 – 675 total UAVs (approximately 432 Shahed/Geran strike UAVs);
• May 24 – 600 total UAVs (approximately 384 Shahed/Geran strike UAVs).

Unlike April 2026, however, the number of continuous day-night attack cycles declined. Russia demonstrated that it retains the capability to conduct prolonged operations extending beyond traditional nighttime windows, but such attacks were less frequent than in the previous month. The most notable example remained the 12–14 May operation, which combined daytime and nighttime UAV waves with missile strikes and involved approximately 1,567 UAVs and dozens of missiles over roughly 38 hours (see Figure 3).

• 1567 (139+753+675) Shahed-type UAVs;
• 3 Kh-47M2 “Kinzhal” air-launched ballistic missiles;
• 35 Kh-101 cruise missiles;
• 18 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles.

The reduction in the number of prolonged attacks may reflect operational considerations, stockpile management, or adjustments in targeting priorities. Nevertheless, the capability remains intact and could be employed again when Russian planners deem it necessary.

• all Shahed-type UAVs, including Shahed/Geran strike UAVs, Italmas (BM‑35), Garpiya A1, Gerbera, and other decoy or auxiliary UAVs;
• Shahed/Geran strike UAVs produced exclusively in Alabuga, which are specifically designated in official reports as “around/over XXX of them being ‘Shaheds’”;
• other Shahed-type UAVs, including Italmas (BM‑35), Garpiya A1, Gerbera, and various decoy UAVs referenced in official Ukrainian reporting.

Official Ukrainian reporting combines kinetically destroyed UAVs and UAVs neutralized through electronic warfare or other suppression methods under the category “shot down/suppressed.”

Official Ukrainian Air Force reporting generally covers the period from approximately 6:00 PM on the previous day until 08:00–09:00 AM on the reporting day. As Russia increasingly conducts daytime UAV attacks, total monthly launch figures derived from official reports may underestimate actual launch volumes by approximately 5–10 percent.

From September 8, 2025, through the morning of May 3, 2026, official Ukrainian reports indicated the approximate number of Shahed/Geran strike UAVs produced in Alabuga among the total number of Shahed-type UAVs launched. After May 3, the number was no longer reported, so the number of Shahed/Geran UAVs launched was subsequently estimated, based on the 2026 trend. According to the 2026 trend, approximately 64 percent of the total number of Shahed-type UAVs launched were Shahed/Geran strike UAVs, while the remaining share consisted primarily of Italmas (BM‑35), Garpiya A1, Gerbera, and decoy UAVs. In absolute terms, the estimated daily average of Shahed/Geran strike UAV launches reached approximately 167 per day — the highest level recorded since observations began (in July 2025, this value was 120 UAVs/day, in March 2026 was 129 UAVs/day, in April 2026 was 144 UAVs/day) (see Table 1 and Figure 4).

Industrial Expansion and Alabuga Production Capacity

The increase from an estimated 144 Shahed/Geran launches per day in April to approximately 167 per day in May provides additional indirect evidence that Russian production capacity continues to expand. Investigative reporting suggests that Russia plans to produce approximately 60,000 long-range UAVs and 50,000 decoy UAVs during 2026. Satellite imagery and independent assessments indicate continuing construction of production halls, dormitories, and security infrastructure. [4] These developments correspond closely with the observed growth in Russian UAV deployment rates during the first half of 2026.

May 2026 confirmed the continued operational use of jet-powered Shahed/Geran variants. Official Ukrainian Air Force statements[5] repeatedly referenced the presence of jet-powered UAVs within attacking formations. Open-source monitoring channels[6] recorded multiple sightings of jet-powered UAVs in southern Ukraine, while Ukrainian military observers reported the use of both Geran-3 and Geran-4 variants during attacks on Kyiv in late May.

Although the available evidence does not permit a precise count, open-source reporting suggests that Russia likely deployed between 30 and 80 jet-powered Geran-3 and Geran-4 UAVs during May 2026, with a best estimate of approximately 50 UAVs. This estimate represents only about 0.5–1.5 percent of the estimated 5,181 Shahed/Geran strike UAVs launched during the month.

The relatively small number of observed jet-powered UAVs indicates that these systems have not yet replaced the piston-engine Geran-2 as Russia’s primary long-range strike UAV. Instead, they appear to be used selectively alongside conventional Shahed/Geran strike packages, possibly to evaluate operational performance, exploit higher flight speeds, or complicate Ukrainian interception efforts. Nevertheless, their repeated appearance throughout May suggests that Russia is moving beyond isolated testing and gradually integrating jet-powered variants into routine combat operations.

The relationship between launch volume and strike effectiveness continued to deteriorate during May. Some of the largest attacks generated the lowest penetration rates.

This pattern suggests diminishing returns from increasingly large UAV swarms. As attack packages grow, Ukrainian defenses appear increasingly capable of adapting and concentrating resources against predictable routes and attack corridors. The result is that additional UAVs do not necessarily translate into proportionally greater strike success.

In May 2026, the overall success hit rate relative to all Shahed-type UAVs was approximately 6.65 percent, while the success hit rate relative to estimated Shahed/Geran strike UAVs was approximately 10.48 percent (see Table 1).

Both rates are the lowest recorded since March 2025. The long-term trend since late 2025 indicates declining hit rates (see Figure 5.a) despite increasing launch volumes, suggesting that Russia continues to prioritize scale and sustained operational pressure over per-UAV strike efficiency. This suggests that Russia increasingly views mass UAV attacks as a tool for exhausting air-defense resources and maintaining persistent pressure on Ukrainian society rather than maximizing the effectiveness of individual strikes.

At the same time, the effectiveness of the strikes varied significantly depending on the launch volume (see Figure 5.b) and target distribution (see also reports for previous months[7]).

The lowest hit rate in May 2026 for Shahed-type UAVs was recorded during the massive attacks (see Table 2):

• May 10 (27 UAVs in total, hit rate of 0 percent), this is very specific case linked to the so-called temporary ceasefire marking Victory Day, during which Russia continued to attack Ukraine using UAVs.
• May 17 (287 total UAVs, 2.79 percent effectiveness), and
• May 18 (524 total UAVs, 3.05 percent effectiveness).
• It is worth noting the attack on May 13, when, despite the highest number of launches in a full day (892 launches), the effectiveness was higher (5.27 percent) compared to the attacks on May 17 and 18.

The highest hit rate occurred during attacks involving lower UAV numbers:

• May 9 (43 UAVs in total, highest effectiveness for May at 20.93 percent), again the case linked to the so-called temporary ceasefire marking Victory Day, during which Russia continued to attack Ukraine using UAVs.
• May 8 (67 total UAVs, effectiveness of 16.42 percent)
• May 19 and 20 (209 and 238 total UAVs, effectiveness of 12.92 percent, 12.18 percent respectively).

Nevertheless, even limited penetration can generate significant strategic effects when targets include energy infrastructure, industrial facilities, transportation hubs, logistics nodes, or civilian residential areas. Consequently, Russia may consider the campaign successful even when a relatively small percentage of UAVs reach their intended targets.

May 2026 confirmed several important operational trends observed during previous months.

• Continued use of mixed UAV strike packages.

Shahed/Geran UAVs produced in Alabuga were consistently deployed alongside Italmas (BM‑35), Garpiya A1, Gerbera, and other decoy or auxiliary UAV systems. The integration of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, strike UAVs, and decoy UAVs suggests continued Russian refinement of layered strike doctrine intended to fragment and saturate Ukrainian defensive responses.

Russia continued to employ extremely low-altitude flight paths that reduce radar visibility and increase Ukrainian dependence on mobile fire groups, short-range systems, visual detection, and interceptor drones.

3. Concentrated border-routing and corridor saturation tactics.

During the large-scale attacks on May 13–14, Russian forces employed a modified flight tactic in which a large number of Shahed-type UAVs flew in tight formations along the Belarusian border, often just a few kilometers apart, moving sequentially through a single corridor (see Fig. 6). According to Serhii FLASH[8], a Ukrainian military analyst and advisor to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, the UAVs were effectively directed “one after another” in large numbers along narrow approach corridors near the Belarusian border.

This tactic appears to have been intended to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense and electronic warfare systems by concentrating a large number of UAVs along a limited number of routes, thereby increasing the likelihood that at least some UAVs would penetrate deep into Ukrainian territory and reach targets in the country’s western regions. This tactic may also serve a reconnaissance function, allowing Russian forces to identify the locations and operational patterns of Ukrainian electronic warfare assets and air defense positions.

Another observation regarding the May attacks is that, despite the obvious operational advantages of using Belarusian airspace, Russian UAVs generally avoided crossing the border with Belarus and instead flew around the border region. This resulted in longer flight routes, increased risk of interception, and more complicated route planning.

The emergence of concentrated routing tactics along the border indicates Russia’s ongoing efforts to adapt its UAV employment concepts in response to Ukraine’s defensive measures and underscores the increasingly dynamic nature of the campaign involving long-range UAVs.

4. Increasing role of interceptor drones.

One of the most important operational developments during May was the growing contribution of Ukrainian interceptor UAVs. Ukrainian military observers reported that interceptor drones accounted for more than 40 percent of Shahed-type UAVs destroyed during some of the largest attacks late in the month.

This trend has significant implications. Interceptor drones provide a relatively inexpensive means of defeating low-cost UAVs and reduce dependence on costly surface-to-air missile systems. As Russia continues to expand production, Ukraine's ability to scale interceptor drone operations may become one of the most important determinants of future air-defense effectiveness.

The growing role of interceptor UAVs also helps explain the declining effectiveness of Russian attacks despite increasing launch volumes. The emergence of this capability represents one of the most important defensive adaptations of 2026.

The evidence from May suggests that Russian UAV operations are increasingly focused on system-level pressure rather than purely target-centric destruction. While infrastructure damage remains important, the broader objectives appear to include exhausting Ukrainian air defenses, forcing repeated nationwide air-raid alerts, disrupting civilian life, and maintaining a constant atmosphere of insecurity.

This interpretation is supported by the declining efficiency of attacks. If the primary objective were simply maximizing physical destruction, the current relationship between launch volume and successful hits would be difficult to justify. Instead, the campaign appears designed to generate cumulative strategic effects through repetition, persistence, and scale.

Large attacks also create opportunities for follow-on missile strikes. By forcing Ukraine to commit air-defense resources against hundreds of UAVs, Russia can increase the probability that cruise missiles or ballistic missiles penetrate defensive coverage.

May 2026 represented a new quantitative peak in Russia's UAV campaign against Ukraine. Record launch volumes demonstrated the growing industrial capacity supporting Russian long-range strike operations, particularly the apparent expansion of production at Alabuga.

At the same time, the month also demonstrated the limits of mass UAV warfare. Despite unprecedented launch volumes, strike effectiveness continued to decline. Ukrainian adaptation—including improved electronic warfare, mobile fire groups, distributed air-defense networks, and interceptor drones—appears to be offsetting much of Russia's quantitative advantage.

Russia therefore appears increasingly dependent on scale. Rather than improving per-UAV effectiveness, it is compensating through larger and more frequent attack packages. This dynamic is likely to remain one of the defining characteristics of the air war during the remainder of 2026.

The May data suggest that Russia's ability to increase UAV production is currently outpacing improvements in UAV design, resulting in a strategy that relies increasingly on quantity rather than improvements in individual platform effectiveness. This trend mirrors developments observed in other Russian strike systems, where production scale increasingly compensates for technological limitations.

The central question moving forward is whether Russian production growth can outpace Ukrainian defensive adaptation. The answer to that question will play a major role in determining the future effectiveness of Russia's long-range UAV campaign. At the same time, the sustainability of Russia's expanding UAV production base remains closely linked to continued access to foreign-sourced electronics, navigation components, communications equipment, and other critical technologies. Despite ongoing efforts to localize production, evidence from recovered UAVs continues to indicate substantial reliance on imported components. As a result, the future trajectory of Russia's UAV campaign will depend not only on domestic manufacturing expansion, but also on its ability to secure and maintain access to international supply chains.

Table 1. Detailed statistics of the launches, interceptions and hits of the total Shahed-type UAVs 
and Shahed (Geran)-strike UAVs in January 2025 through May 2026.

Figure 1. Monthly launches of the Shahed-type UAVs (total and specifically Shahed/Geran-strike UAVs) vs Hits from January 2025 through May 2026.

Figure 2a. Statistics of the daily launches of the Shahed-type UAVs in August 2024 through May 2026.

Figure 2b.     Statistics of the daily launches of the Shahed-type UAVs in January 2026 through May 2026.

Figure 3. The maps show a 24-hour combined attack that ran from morning of May 13 to morning of May 14, 2026, and included both nighttime and daytime phases.

(Source: https://t.me/StrategicaviationT/30977, https://t.me/StrategicaviationT/31212) 
 

Figure 4. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed/Geran strike UAVs in September 2025 through May 2026.

Figure 5a.   Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the total Shahed-type UAVs in January 2025 through May 2026.

Figure 5b.   Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the Shahed/Geran strike UAVs in January 2026 through May 2026.

Table 2. Daily statistics on the number of launches, hits, and hit effectiveness for all Shahed-type UAVs, as well as specifically for Shahed (Geran) strike UAVs, in May 2026.

Figure 6. Example of concentrated Shahed-type UAV routing along the Belarusian border during the May 13–14 attack sequence. UAVs were observed moving in closely spaced columns and large groups simultaneously, suggesting a deliberate saturation tactic intended to overwhelm Ukrainian air-defense and electronic warfare coverage.

[2] Total Shahed-type UAV launches also included Italmas (BM‑35), Garpiya A1, Gerbera, and other decoy UAVs.

[4] David Albright, Spencer Faragasso, and the Good ISIS Team, “Major Developments at Alabuga SEZ Point to Significant Expansion in Military Drone Production,” Institute for Science and International Security, July 28, 2025, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/major-developments-at-alabuga-sez-point-to-significant-expansion-in-military-drone-production; https://oboronka.mezha.ua/en/alabuga-zseredini-311540/

[6] https://t.me/war_monitor, https://t.me/mon1tor_ua, https://t.me/monitoringwar, https://t.me/vanek_nikolaev, https://t.me/veselyy_pivden

[7]Igor Anokhin, “Monthly Analysis of Russian Shahed 136 Deployment Against Ukraine,” Institute for Science and International Security, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/monthly-analysis-of-russian-shahed-136-deployment-against-ukraine.

APRIL 2026

April 2026 marked a new peak in the scale and operational complexity of Russian Shahed-type UAV attacks against Ukraine. According to official data[1], Russia launched 6,583 Shahed-type UAVs, of which 4,335 were identified as Shahed/Geran strike UAVs produced in Alabuga. The average launch rate reached 219 total UAVs[2] (145 Shahed/Geran) daily, exceeding both previous peaks in March 2026 (208/day) and in July 2025 (203/day) (see Table 1, Figure 1).

• A notable feature of April was the continuation of large-scale attacks, with three nights seeing over 600 all Shahed-type UAVs being launched (see Figures 2):
  • April 1 – 700 total UAVs (exactly 450 Shahed/Geran strike UAVs);
  • April 16 – 659 total UAVs (exactly 433 Shahed/Geran strike UAVs);
  • April 25 – 619 total UAVs (exactly 400 Shahed/Geran strike UAVs).
• A significant operational development was the emergence of continuous combined night-day strike cycles, culminating in the record 32-hours attack from evening of April 14 through the morning of April 16 (see Figure 3). During this period, Russia deployed[3]:
• 983 Shahed-type UAVs;
• 20 Kh-101 cruise missiles;
• 23 Iskander-M ballistic missiles;
• 5 Iskander-K cruise missiles.

• April 2026 also was marked by an increase in daytime attacks involving small numbers of UAVs launched in a single wave. This was particularly evident in late April, when Russia continuously targeting Odesa and frontline cities. Official Ukrainian Air Force reporting generally covers the period from approximately 6:00 PM on the previous day until 08:00–09:00 AM on the reporting day. As Russia increasingly conducts daytime UAV attacks, total monthly launch figures derived from official reports may underestimate actual launch volumes by approximately 5–10 %.
• Since September 8, 2025, official Ukrainian reporting has increasingly distinguished the approximate number of Shahed/Geran strike UAVs within overall Shahed-type UAV launches. In April 2026, approximately 66% of all launched Shahed-type UAVs were assessed to be Shahed/Geran strike UAVs produced in Alabuga, while the remaining share consisted primarily of Italmas (BM‑35), Garpiya A1, Gerbera, and decoy UAVs. In absolute terms, the estimated daily average of Shahed/Geran strike UAV launches reached approximately 144 per day — the highest level recorded since observations began (in July 2025, this value was 120 UAVs/day, in March 2026 was 129 UAVs/day) (see Table 1 and Figure 4).
• April further confirmed Russia’s continued use of mixed UAV strike packages combining Shahed/Geran, Gerbera, Italmas (BM‑35), and other UAV types alongside cruise and ballistic missiles in layered strike structures designed to saturate Ukrainian air defenses and increase strike penetration. Collectively, these trends indicate that Russia is transitioning from episodic mass attacks toward sustained system-level pressure on Ukraine’s air defense network and critical infrastructure.

• all Shahed-type UAVs, including Shahed/Geran strike UAVs, Italmas (BM‑35), Garpiya A1, Gerbera, and other decoy or auxiliary UAVs;
• Shahed/Geran strike UAVs produced exclusively in Alabuga, which are specifically designated in official reports as “around/over XXX of them being ‘Shaheds’”;
• other Shahed-type UAVs, including Italmas (BM‑35), Garpiya A1, Gerbera, and various decoy UAVs referenced in official Ukrainian reporting.

Because many official reports were issued while attacks were still ongoing, some daily launch totals may slightly underestimate the final number of UAVs employed.

In April 2026, the overall success hits rate relative to all Shahed-type UAV was approximately 9.25 %, while the success hits rate relative specifically to estimated Shahed/Geran strike UAV was approximately 14.05 % (see Table 1).

Although both rates increased slightly compared to March 2026, they remain among the lowest recorded since April 2025. The long-term trend since late 2025 indicates declining hit rates (see Figure 5.a) despite increasing launch volumes, suggesting that Russia continues to prioritize scale and sustained operational pressure over per-UAV strike efficiency.

At the same time, the effectiveness of the strikes varied significantly depending on the launch volume (see Figure 5.b) and target distribution (see also reports for previous months[4]).

The lowest hits rate in April 2026 for Shahed-type UAVs was recorded during the massive attacks (see Table 2):

• April 4 (286 UAVs in total, hits rate of 3.85%),
• April 15 (324 total UAVs, 4.01% effectiveness), and
• April 16 (659 total UAVs, 3.03% effectiveness).
• It is worth noting the attack on April 1, when, despite the highest number of launches in a full day (700 launches), the effectiveness was higher (4.86%) compared to the attacks on April 4, 15, and 16.

• April 6 (141 UAVs in total, effectiveness 18.44%),
• April 7 (110 total UAVs, highest effectiveness for April at 28.18%), and
• April 27 (94 total UAVs, effectiveness of 21.28%).

Despite relatively low penetration rates during the largest attacks, even a limited number of successful strikes can generate significant strategic effects if targets include:

• energy infrastructure;
• industrial facilities;
• power transmission hubs;
• logistics and port infrastructure.

Russia continues to employ layered strike tactics in which decoy UAVs trigger air defense activation, strike UAVs follow in large numbers, and cruise or ballistic missiles target high-value infrastructure after Ukrainian defenses become saturated. This pattern was clearly observed during the combined attacks of April 1, April 3-4, and April 14-16.

April 2026 confirmed several important operational trends observed during previous months.

1. Sustained day-night operational cycles.

Russia increasingly conducted continuous multi-wave attacks extending beyond nighttime windows. The emergence of sustained 24–32‑hour strike cycles represent a major evolution in Russian UAV operations and significantly complicates Ukrainian defensive resource allocation.

2. Continued use of mixed UAV strike packages.

Russia continues to employ extremely low-altitude flight paths that reduce radar visibility and increase Ukrainian dependence on mobile fire groups, short-range systems, visual detection, and interceptor drones.

Compared with operational patterns observed in 2024 and early 2025, April 2026 suggests that Russia is increasingly capable of sustaining high-tempo UAV operations without requiring prolonged operational pauses between major strike cycles.

5. Increasing role of interceptor drones.

The growing role of low-cost interceptor UAVs appears increasingly important in countering mass Shahed-type attacks, potentially reducing reliance on expensive surface-to-air missile interceptors against low-cost targets.

1. April 2026 represents a new quantitative peak in Russia’s UAV warfare against Ukraine.

Russia launched the highest number of Shahed-type UAVs recorded to date while sustaining unprecedented daily operational tempo (see Figure 1 and Table 1).

2. The emergence of continuous 24–32‑hour attack cycles represent a critical operational shift.

Rather than relying exclusively on concentrated nighttime attacks, Russia increasingly conducted continuous multi-wave operations extending into daylight hours, thereby increasing operational strain on Ukrainian air defenses and reducing opportunities for force regeneration.

3. Ukrainian defensive adaptation remains effective despite growing operational pressure.

Despite record launch volumes, overall hits rates remained comparatively low, suggesting that Ukrainian air defense adaptation — including the growing use of interceptor drones, mobile fire groups, distributed electronic warfare systems, and layered defenses — continues to impose significant attrition on attacking UAV formations.

4. Shahed-type UAVs remain a central instrument of strategic pressure.

• direct strikes on infrastructure;
• saturation and exhaustion of air defense systems;
• enabling more effective missile strikes;
• imposing continuous operational strain on Ukrainian defense systems.

5. The strategic impact of even limited hits remains high.

Even relatively small numbers of successful hits can disrupt critical infrastructure, logistics, and civilian systems under conditions of repeated mass attacks.

Following a relative stabilization in launch rates between September 2025 and January 2026, Russia demonstrated a renewed and sustained increase in Shahed-type UAV deployment beginning in February 2026. The scale and persistence of April 2026 operations strongly suggest that Russia has expanded serial production capacity for Shahed-type UAVs, particularly at the Alabuga production complex and at other enterprises within Russia’s military-industrial complex.

The ability to sustain repeated 500–700 UAV attack cycles within short operational intervals indicates not merely the expenditure of accumulated stockpiles but likely a stable or expanding production and replenishment pipeline.

In April 2026, Russian UAV strike operations entered A new phase characterized by:

• unprecedented launch volumes
• sustained operational tempo;
• continuous day-night attack cycles;
• increasingly integrated missile-UAV strike packages;
• nationwide targeting patterns.

These developments demonstrate a continued Russian effort to impose system-level pressure on Ukrainian air defense networks and critical infrastructure.

At the same time, the comparatively low penetration rates observed during even the largest attacks indicate that Ukrainian defensive adaptation remains effective despite growing operational stress. The long-term balance between Russian production capacity and Ukraine’s ability to sustain layered interception capabilities will likely remain one of the central operational dynamics shaping the future course of the air war.
 

Table 1. Detailed statistics of the launches, interceptions and hits of the total Shahed-type UAVs 
and exactly Shahed (Geran) UAVs in January 2025 through April 2026.

Figure 1. Monthly launches of the Shahed-type UAVs (Total and exactly Shahed/Geran) vs Hits in January 2025 through April 2026.

Figure 2. Statistics of the daily launches of the Shahed-type UAVs in August 2024 through April 2026.

Figure 3. The maps show a 32-hour combined attack that ran from evening of April 14 to morning of April 16, 2026, and included both nighttime and daytime phases
(Source https://t.me/mon1tor_ua/65217?single ). 
 

Figure 4. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed/Geran strike UAVs in September 2025 through April 2026.

Figure 5a.   Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the total Shahed-type UAVs in January 2025 through April 2026.

Figure 5b. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the Shahed/Geran strike UAVs in December 2025 through April 2026.

Table 2. Daily statistics on the number of launches, hits, and hit effectiveness for all Shahed-type UAVs, as well as specifically for Shahed (Geran) strike UAVs, in April 2026.

[2]Total Shahed-type UAV launches also included Italmas (BM‑35), Garpia A1, Gerbera, and other decoy UAVs.

MARCH 2026

March 2026 marked a new peak in the scale and operational complexity of Russian Shahed-type UAV attacks against Ukraine. According to updated data, Russia launched 6,462 Shahed-type UAVs and related strike/decoy drones, of which 4,186 were identified as Shahed/Geran strike UAVs. The average launch rate reached 208 UAVs per day, exceeding both February 2026 (181/day) and the previous peak in July 2025 (203/day) (see Table 1, Figure 1).

• A notable feature of March was the resumption of large-scale attacks, with several nights seeing over 400 UAVs being launched. These included:
• March 7 – approximately 480 UAVs;
• March 14 – approximately 430 UAVs;
• The most significant development was the emergence of continuous 24-hour strike cycles, which culminated in the record attack of 24 March 2026. Between 6:00 PM on 23 March and 6:00 PM on 24 March, Russia launched 948 Shahed-type UAVs and 35 missiles, representing the highest daily UAV deployment against Ukraine since the war began (see Figures 2 and 3).
• Since September 8, official sources have begun to publish the approximate number of Shahed/Geran strike drones in the total number of launches. As shown in Table 1, the average number of Shahed-type strike drones in March 2026 is approximately 65% of the total number of drones launched, which is close to the highest figure (66% in January) for the entire observation period. In absolute terms, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 4, the average daily number of strike UAVs of the Shahed/Geran model is 135/day, which is the highest rate since the observations began (in July 2025, this value was 120 UAVs).
• In addition, March confirmed that Russia is continuing to utilize mixed UAV strike packages, incorporating Shahed/Geran, Gerbera, and Italmas (BM-35) drones. These were used in conjunction with cruise and ballistic missiles in layered attack structures designed to saturate air defense and increase strike penetration. Taken together, these trends indicate that Russia is shifting from episodic mass attacks to sustained, system-level pressure designed to continuously degrade Ukraine’s air defense capacity.

To assess effectiveness, it is necessary to distinguish between:

• All Shahed-type UAVs (including decoys), and
• Strike UAVs (Shahed/Geran, Italmas, Harpy-type, etc.).

• The overall hit rate (relative to all UAV launches) was 8.2 percent;
• The strike effectiveness (relative to Shahed/Geran launches) was 12.66 percent (see Table 1).

Both indicators are lower than in February 2026 (10.83% and 17.02%, respectively), despite a sharp increase in the number of launches. Moreover, as shown in Figure 5.a and 5.b, the hit rate for Shahed-type UAVs in March 2026 is the lowest since March 2025 and shows a steady decline starting in October 2025 (18.67%). These figures illustrate a sustained decline in strike effectiveness since late 2025, despite increasing launch volumes. This suggests that Russia is prioritizing volume over efficiency, accepting lower strike effectiveness in exchange for sustained pressure and air defense exhaustion.

At the same time, as shown in Figure 5.b, the effectiveness of the strikes varied significantly depending on both the number of launches per day and the area targeted (see reports for previous months[1]).

Even though effectiveness remained relatively low (~5 percent) during the most intense attacks, such as on 24 March, even a small number of successful strikes can have a disproportionately large strategic impact, especially if the targets are:

• energy infrastructure;
• power transmission hubs;
• industrial facilities;
• port and logistics infrastructure.

Russia continues to rely on layered strike tactics, in which:

• Decoy UAVs trigger air defense activation;
• Strike UAVs follow in large numbers;
• Missiles target high-value infrastructure once defenses are saturated.

This pattern was clearly observed during the combined attacks of March 7, March 14, and March 24.

March 2026 confirmed several key trends observed in previous months:

1. Transition to continuous operations (day + night)

Russia increasingly conducts multi-phase attacks extending beyond nighttime windows, complicating detection cycles and resource allocation.

Shahed/Geran UAVs are now consistently deployed alongside:

• Gerbera UAVs (initially decoys, increasingly multi-role);
• Italmas (BM-35) UAVs;
• Other UAV types.

Russia continues to employ extremely low-altitude flight paths, reducing radar visibility and increasing reliance on short-range and visual detection systems.

1. March 2026 represents a new quantitative peak in Russia’s UAV warfare.

Russia launched the highest number of Shahed-type UAVs recorded to date, with a sustained high daily average (see Figure 1 and Table 1).

2. The emergence of 24-hour attack cycles is a critical shift.

The March 24 attack demonstrates Russia’s ability to sustain continuous pressure, significantly increasing operational complexity for Ukrainian air defense.

3. Ukraine’s air defense effectiveness is improving.

Despite record launch volumes, hit rates declined, indicating improved interception capabilities, including the growing role of interceptor drones, mobile fire groups, and layered defense systems.

• Direct strikes on infrastructure;
• Saturation and exhaustion of air defense systems;
• Enabling more effective missile strikes.

5. The strategic impact remains high despite low hit ratios.

Even limited penetration can disrupt energy systems, logistics, and civilian infrastructure, especially under conditions of repeated large-scale attacks.

In March 2026, Russian strike operations using Shahed-type UAVs entered a new phase characterized by scale, persistence, and operational depth. The combination of:

• Record launch volumes;
• Multi-wave attacks;
• Daytime continuation strikes;
• Nationwide targeting;

Overall, demonstrates a shift toward continuous, system-level pressure on Ukraine’s air defense and infrastructure.

At the same time, Ukraine’s ability to reduce hit rates despite increasing attack scale highlights the growing effectiveness of adaptive countermeasures, particularly the integration of interceptor drones and distributed air defense systems.

The balance between Russian mass production and deployment capacity and Ukrainian interception capability will remain the decisive factor shaping the evolution of this war.

Table 1. Detailed statistics of the launches, interceptions and hits of the total Shahed-type UAVs and exactly Shahed (Geran) UAVs in January 2025 through February 2026.

Figure 1. Monthly launches of the Shahed-type UAVs (Total and exactly Shahed/Geran) vs Hits in January 2025 through March 2026.

Figure 2. Statistics of the daily launches of the Shahed-type UAVs in August 2024 through March 2026.

Figure 3. Maps illustrating the largest UAV attack of the war, showing both the nighttime wave and the daytime expansion phase (March 23–24, 2026).
(Source https://t.me/mon1tor_ua/64060 )
 

Figure 4. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed/Geran strike UAVs in September 2025 through March 2026.

Figure 5a. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the total Shahed-type UAVs in January 2025 through March 2026.

Figure 5b. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the Shahed/Geran strike UAVs in December 2025 through March 2026.

FEBRUARY 2026

As noted in a statement by the Ukrainian Air Force[1], this winter has been one of the most difficult tests for Ukraine's air defense system. Russia has focused its efforts on destroying Ukraine's critical infrastructure, using an unprecedented number of missiles and drones. During the three winter months, the Air Force, in cooperation with the Ukrainian Defense Forces, repelled 14 massive, combined attacks by the enemy. Russia combined strikes with various types of UAVs and missiles to overload the air defense system and exhaust its resources.

• February 2026 was a month of peak attacks. In February, Ukraine endured seven combined large-scale attacks. Thus, during February, compared to December 2025 and January 2026, the intensity of massive attacks doubled. On February 3, Russia launched the largest number of missiles in a single strike for the entire winter – 71 units. The same attack involved 450 UAVs of various types (see Figure. 1).
• After a downturn in January 2026, which was most likely due to extremely difficult weather conditions that affected the number of launches, four attacks involving a large number of UAVs (around 400 or more UAVs per night) took place again in February, but there were no attacks involving more than 500 UAVs per night, as was the case in July-December 2025. It should be noted that despite the absence of attacks involving 500 or more, the average number per day was higher, indicating a more even distribution, although the wave-like structure of the attacks remained (see Figure. 2 and Table 1).
• February saw a continuation of the trend toward saturation in the number of launches of Shahed-type UAVs, which had been observed since the beginning of the summer, with two declines in August 2025 and January 2026. 5,059 Shahed-type UAVs were launched in February, of which 3,220 were identified as Shahed/Geran strike UAVs, while the rest were classified as other Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones. The average frequency of launches of all Shahed-type drones in February was approximately 181 per day. This is higher than the average number of Shahed drone launches during the summer and fall of 2025, which was 175 drones per day, with a peak in July, when the average was 203 drones per day.
• Since September 8, official sources have begun to publish the approximate number of Shahed/Geran strike drones in the total number of launches. As shown in Table 1, the average number of Shahed-type strike drones in February 2026 is approximately 64% of the total number of drones launched, which is close to the highest figure (66% in January) for the entire observation period. In absolute terms, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 3, the average daily number of strike UAVs of the Shahed/Geran model is 115, which is the highest figure since the beginning of autumn 2025 and the second highest since observations began (in July 2025, this figure was 120 UAVs).
• Russia has changed its tactics for Shahed-type UAVs launching — it has begun to launch strike UAVs at extremely low altitudes. This was reported by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi[2]. He emphasized that UAV interceptors have begun to play a key role in countering such tactics. In February, Ukrainian interceptor drones carried out about 6,300 sorties, destroying more than 1,500 Russian UAVs of various types. For example, in Kyiv and its surroundings, more than 70% of Shaheds were shot down in February with the help of interceptors[3].
• A notable feature of January-February 2026 was the reports of the use of Russian-made strike drones BM-35[4], also known as Italmas[5], not only in frontline areas but also deep inside Ukrainian territory (see our January’s report[6]). That is why, starting on January 15, the name Italmas has been highlighted separately in reports from the Ukrainian Air Force, namely, “… the enemy attacked with 187 strike UAVs of the type Shahed, Gerber, Italmas, and UAVs of other types” (“У ніч на 27 лютого (з 18:00 26 лютого) противник атакував 187 ударними БпЛА типу Shahed, Гербера, Італмас та безпілотниками інших типів.”[7]
• After a more in-depth study of the context, it should be noted that in the daily reports of the Ukrainian Air Force, the phrase “of which about 120 are Shaheds” (… із них близько 120 – "шахеди"[8]) most likely refers exclusively to strike UAVs such as Shahed and Geran, while Italmas (BM-35), Harpy-A1, etc. are not included in this number. This is very important to know to correctly calculate the production rates of Shahed/Geran strike UAVs in Alabuga.
• It is also still unclear why the Ukrainian Air Force's daily reports include Gerber UAVs among strike drones, even though they were initially positioned as decoy drones, which were then equipped with additional video surveillance and online control equipment.
• The next notable feature of January-February 2026 was the use of Starlink for manual control of BM-35 strike UAVs[9], and then in Shahed[10] (see our January Report). In early February 2026, Elon Musk said his Starlink had stopped “unauthorized use” of satellite internet terminals by Russian drones, after Ukraine appealed for help disabling the communication technology that it said was proving a dangerous tool assisting Russian drone attacks[11]. Despite this, according to reports from Ukrainian monitoring channels[12], BM-35 (Italmas) UAVs were spotted attacking western regions of Ukraine (Kovel, Lviv, Rivne) on February 6, 12, and 13.
• On December 26, 2025, President Volodymyr Zelensky said that equipment was being used in Belarus near the Ukrainian border to guide Shahed drones to targets in western Ukraine. On February 27, 2026, Ukraine's defense minister said Ukraine had managed to take down this mesh network used by the Shaheds in the north, which had a positive impact on the defense capabilities of Kyiv and central Ukraine.
• In February, Russia continues launching strike UAVs and decoy drones not only at night, but also during the day. At the same time, Ukrainian Air Force reports are usually released at 8-9 a.m. and cover the period from 6 p.m. the previous day. Thus, it appears that drones launched between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. may not be included in the reports, and therefore the total number of UAVs launched per day may be higher than reported. This may be one of the reasons for the decrease in the number of UAVs in January compared to December.

First, it should be emphasized that the main purpose of decoy drones, even though some of them are equipped with small cumulative munitions, is to distract attention and exhaust air defense systems, as well as to conduct video reconnaissance. To assess the effectiveness of strikes, it is necessary to consider not all Shahed-type UAVs launched but specifically strike-type models such as Shahed-136/131, Gerani-2-3, Harpy-1A, and Italmas. The following estimates are provided: overall effectiveness and strike effectiveness of attack UAVs (in parentheses).

As shown in Table 1, the average percentage of hits relative to the total number of Shahed-type UAV launches (both strike and decoy) showed a significant increase from 2-3% in January-February 2025 to 9% in March 2025. Since April 2025, this figure has increased even more, ranging from 11.5% to 18.7%, and in terms of the number of strike UAV launches, from 19.5% to 32.3%, respectively.

In February 2026, these indicators decreased to 10.83% overall and 17.02% for strike UAVs, respectively. This indicates an improvement in the performance of the Ukrainian air defense system and the special role of interceptor drones, as noted above.

It should be noted that, as in previous months, during some attacks, especially large ones that penetrated deep into Ukrainian territory, the relative effectiveness decreased to 4.55% (if all UAVs are considered) and 7.2% (if only strike UAVs are considered). At the same time, in February 2026, the distribution of strike effectiveness was slightly more even compared to previous months, with values not exceeding 32% (if all UAVs are considered) and 50% (if only strike UAVs are considered) (see Figure. 4.a, 4.b and Figure.5).

Even with relatively low hit ratios, the strategic effect of Shahed attacks remains significant due to their ability to exhaust Ukrainian air defense resources. Even with relatively low hit ratios, the strategic effect of Shahed attacks remains significant due to their ability to exhaust Ukrainian air defense resources.

A defining feature of February 2026 was Russia’s concentration of strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The primary targets included:

• 330–750 kV power stations;
• hub power stations near large cities;
• facilities for transmitting electricity between regions;
• gas infrastructure;
• thermal power plants and combined heat and power plants (CHPPs), which provide centralized heating and hot water supply for Ukrainian cities.

In February 2026, Shahed-type UAVs continued to serve a dual purpose:

• Directly striking infrastructure targets.
• Depleting Ukraine’s air defense resources, thereby increasing the effectiveness of missile strikes, which are significantly more expensive.

A detailed analysis of strike statistics and geography highlights several key factors that enhanced the effectiveness of Shahed UAV operations:

• Close proximity of target areas to the frontline or Ukraine’s borders (e.g., Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa) reduced flight time and enabled more efficient route planning.
• Russia increasingly implemented advanced technical solutions, including:
• the increasing deployment of multi-element CRPA antennas (especially 16-element) significantly improves resistance to Ukrainian electronic warfare systems, allowing Shahed UAVs to maintain navigation in heavily jammed environments;
• attempted integration of Starlink connectivity to neutralize EW countermeasures;
• the use of relay drones carrying radio modems to form a decentralized airborne mesh network, moving together with groups of strike UAVs;
• integration of online cameras and modems, enabling real-time flight path adjustments and evasive maneuvers.

The most critical factor remains the continuous mass deployment of Shahed-type UAVs, which rapidly exhaust Ukraine’s air defense resources.

• Effective countermeasures require:

• strengthening asymmetric responses, particularly the development and large-scale deployment of interceptor drones;
• further advancement of counter-UAV technologies, keeping pace with the ongoing modernization of Shahed UAVs;
• ensuring uninterrupted and increased deliveries of Western air defense systems and interceptors to Ukraine.

OSINT-based estimates suggest that the Alabuga facility likely produces 80–120 Shahed/Geran strike UAVs per day, depending on component availability. This indicates that there is some key component that is preventing production from being ramped up. Perhaps production is limited not by the bodies, but by the engines, most likely the MD-550 engine or its Russian copy. It is the engines that are more difficult to manufacture and could be a bottleneck.

Russian strike packages increasingly demonstrate a layered structure: decoy UAVs are launched first to trigger air defense activation, followed by Shahed-type strike drones, and finally cruise or ballistic missiles aimed at high-value infrastructure targets.

In February 2026, Shahed-type UAVs continued to be a key instrument in Russia’s campaign to systematically undermine Ukraine’s energy resilience. The combination of technological improvements, harsh winter conditions, and accumulated infrastructure damage produced a significant strategic effect, underscoring the urgent need to further strengthen Ukraine’s air defense and counter-drone capabilities.

Figure 1.  The map of the most massive, combined strike on Ukrainian territory this winter: 
the night of February 2-3, 2026. (Source https://t.me/mon1tor_ua/61914 )

On the night of February 3 (from 6:00 p.m. on February 2), the enemy carried out a combined strike on Ukraine using various types of air- and ground-based missiles and strike UAVs. In total, the Air Force's radio-technical troops recorded 521 air attack weapons:

• 4 Zircon/Onyx missiles (launch area: TOT AR Crimea);
  • 32 Iskander-M/S-300 ballistic missiles (launch area: Bryansk region, RF, TOT Crimea);
  • 7 Kh-22/Kh-32 cruise missiles (from the airspace of the Bryansk region, Russian Federation);
  • 28 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles (Caspian Sea, Kursk region, Russian Federation);
  • 450 strike UAVs of the Shahed, Gerber, Italmas types and other types of drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, Orel, Shatalovo, Millerovo, Primorsko-Akhtarsk – Russian Federation, about 300 of them – Shahed.

Figure 2. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type UAVs in January 2025 through February 2026.

Figure 3. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed/Geran strike UAVs in September 2025 through February 2026.

Figure 4a. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the total Shahed-type UAVs in January 2025 through February 2026.

Figure 4b. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the Shahed/Geran strike UAVs in December 2025 through February 2026.

Figure 5.  Monthly Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type UAVs (Total and exactly Shahed/Geran) in January 2025 through February 2026.
 

[5] https://avia-pro.net/blog/bpla-bm-35-italmas-rossiyskiy-strazh-fronta-v-ere-bespilotnyh-operaciy

[6] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/monthly-analysis-of-russian-shahed-136-deployment-against-ukraine

JANUARY 2026

• In January, the trend toward saturation and even a gradual decrease in the number of launches of Shahed-type UAVs, which had been observed since the beginning of autumn, continued. Specifically, 4442 Shahed-type drones were launched in January, of which 2915 were designated as Shahed/Geran strike drones, and the remaining drones were categorized as decoy drones. This is the lowest figure recorded since the onset of autumn. The mean frequency of Shahed-type UAV launches in January, including decoys, was approximately 143 per day. This figure is lower than the average number of Shahed drone launches during the summer and fall of 2025, which was 175 UAVs per day, with a peak in July, when the average was 203 drones per day (see Fig. 1 and Table 1). Although there were no mass attacks involving 450 or more UAVs per attack in January 2026, as in previous months, January 2026 was notable for the use of large numbers of various types of missiles in combination with strike UAVs against Ukraine's energy infrastructure.
• A notable feature of January 2026 was the reports of the use of Russian-made strike drones BM-35[1], also known as Italmas[2] (see notes in the end of the paragraph), not only in frontline areas but also deep inside Ukrainian territory. This is a hybrid version of the Lancet loitering munition, but it has the shape of a Shahed and a gasoline engine in the front. This strike and reconnaissance UAV currently ranks second in terms of mass, flight range, and warhead weight among Russian strike drones[3]. That is why, starting on January 15, Italmas drones have been listed by name in reports from the Ukrainian Air Force.
  • It should be noted that there is some confusion in the names, namely: the name “Italmas” is used for the “Product-54” model, which is manufactured by ZALA Aero Group [4],[5]. At the same time, the name “Product-54” at specialized military exhibitions and industry resources[6] is associated with the BM-35 model, where Italmas is mentioned as having been developed as part of the “Product-54” project. Thus, the BM-35 and Italmas are essentially the same product, often used under different code names (including “Product-54”).
• The second notable feature of January 2026 was the use of Starlink for manual control of BM-35 strike UAVs[7], and then in Shahed[8]. For example, at the end of January, a guided BM-35 was recorded flying to Dnipro, and on January 26, it flew unhindered over Kyiv for almost four hours (see Fig. 2). However, in early February 2026, Elon Musk said his Starlink had stopped “unauthorized use” of satellite internet terminals by Russian drones, after Ukraine appealed for help disabling the communication technology that it said was proving a dangerous tool assisting Russian drone attacks[9].
• The third notable development in January was that Russia began launching strike UAVs and decoy drones not only at night, but also during the day. At the same time, Ukrainian Air Force reports are usually released at 8-9 a.m. and cover the period from 6 p.m. the previous day. Thus, it appears that drones launched between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. may not be included in the reports, and therefore the total number of UAVs launched per day may be higher than reported. This may be one of the reasons for the decrease in the number of UAVs in January compared to December.
• Since September 8, official sources have begun to publish the approximate number of Shahed/Geran strike drones in the total number of launches. As shown in Table 1, the average number of Shahed-type strike drones in January 2026 is approximately 66% of the total number of drones launched, which is the highest figure for the entire observation period. This may be due to the increased use of Italmas (manufactured in Izhevsk) in addition to Shahed/Geran, which are manufactured in Alabuga.
  • That is why, even though the total number of launches in January was the lowest since autumn 2025, the average number of strike drone launches in January 2026 did not differ significantly from previous months and amounted to 94 strike drones per day (See Fig. 3).
  • Also, as can be seen in Fig. 3, in January 2026, the number of launches of Shahed-type strike UAVs was more uniform than in previous months.

Firstly, it should be emphasized that the main purpose of decoy drones, despite some of them being equipped with small cumulative munitions, is to distract attention and exhaust air defense systems, as well as to conduct video reconnaissance. To assess the effectiveness of strikes, it is imperative to consider not all launched UAVs of the Shahed type, but specifically the strike-type models, such as the Shahed-136/131, Geran2-3, Harpy 1A and Italmas. The following assessments will be provided: overall effectiveness and the effectiveness of hits by the strike UAVs (in parentheses).

As demonstrated in Table 1, the average percentage of hits relative to the total number of Shahed-type UAV launches (both strike and decoy drones) exhibited a marked increase from 2-3% in January-February 2025 to 9% in March 2025. Since April 2025, this figure has further elevated, ranging from 11.5% to 18.7%, and in terms of the number of strike UAV launches, from 19.5% to 32.3%, respectively. In January 2026, these figures were 14.61% total and 22.26% strike-type UAVs, respectively.

It is noteworthy that, as in previous months, during certain attacks, particularly those of a large scale that penetrated deeply into Ukrainian territory, the relative effectiveness decreased to 4.8% (when all UAVs are considered) and 7.2% (when only strike UAVs are considered). Concurrently, in January 2026, the distribution of strike effectiveness exhibited greater uniformity compared to previous months, with values not exceeding 28% (when all UAVs are considered) and 40% (when only strike UAVs are considered) (refer to Figures 4.a and 4.b).

• A defining feature of January 2026 was Russia’s concentration of strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The primary targets included:

• 750 kV high-voltage substations, which form the backbone of Ukraine’s Integrated Power System. These substations are critical for transmitting electricity from nuclear power plants, enabling long-distance power transfers between regions, and maintaining synchronization with the European ENTSO-E grid.
• Thermal power plants and combined heat and power plants (CHPPs), which provide centralized heating and hot water supply for Ukrainian cities.

2. In January 2026, Shahed-type UAVs continued to serve a dual purpose:

• Directly striking infrastructure targets.
• Depleting Ukraine’s air defense resources, thereby increasing the effectiveness of missile strikes, which are significantly more expensive.

Although the overall number and strike effectiveness of Shahed UAVs in January 2026 were lower than in previous months (see Fig. 7), the actual damage was greater due to:

• severe winter weather conditions,
• extreme frost,
• the cumulative impact of prior infrastructure damage.

3. A detailed analysis of strike statistics and geography highlights several key factors that enhanced the effectiveness of Shahed UAV operations:

• Close proximity of target areas to the frontline or Ukraine’s borders (e.g., Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa) reduced flight time and enabled more efficient route planning.
• Russia increasingly implemented advanced technical solutions, including:
• the introduction of 16-element CRPA antennas, significantly improving resistance to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems;
• attempted integration of Starlink connectivity to neutralize EW countermeasures;
• the use of relay drones carrying radio modems to form a decentralized airborne mesh network, moving together with groups of strike UAVs;
• integration of online cameras and modems, enabling real-time flight path adjustments and evasive maneuvers.

• On 16 January 2026, Ukraine received a “substantial package of air defense missiles” at a critical moment, as interceptor stocks had been severely depleted following a series of attacks.
• However, this assistance remains insufficient, given:
  • the continuous destruction of critical infrastructure,
  • reports that several large facilities have been almost completely destroyed and are beyond repair due to sustained strikes.

5. The most critical factor remains the continuous mass deployment of Shahed-type UAVs, which rapidly exhaust Ukraine’s air defense resources.

• Effective countermeasures require:

• strengthening asymmetric responses, particularly the development and large-scale deployment of interceptor drones;
• further advancement of counter-UAV technologies, keeping pace with the ongoing modernization of Shahed UAVs;
• ensuring uninterrupted and increased deliveries of Western air defense systems and interceptors to Ukraine.

In January 2026, Shahed-type UAVs continued to be a key instrument in Russia’s campaign to systematically undermine Ukraine’s energy resilience. Even with fewer launches, the combination of technological improvements, harsh winter conditions, and accumulated infrastructure damage produced a significant strategic effect, underscoring the urgent need to further strengthen Ukraine’s air defense and counter-drone capabilities.

Figure 1. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type UAVs in January 2025 through January 2026.

Table 1. Detailed statistics of the launches, interceptions and hits of the Shahed-type UAVs in January 2025 through January 2026.

Figure 2. Approximate trajectory of guided UAVs equipped with cameras between January 23 and 27, 2026. (Source https://t.me/mon1tor_ua/61508 )

Figure 3. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type strike UAVs in September 2025 through January 2026.

Figure 4a. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the total Shahed-type UAVs in September 2025 through January 2026.

Figure 4b. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type strike UAVs in September 2025 through January 2026.

Figure 5. Monthly Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type UAVs (Total and Strike) in January 2025 through January 2026.

[2] https://avia-pro.net/blog/bpla-bm-35-italmas-rossiyskiy-strazh-fronta-v-ere-bespilotnyh-operaciy

[6] https://avia-pro.net/blog/bpla-bm-35-italmas-rossiyskiy-strazh-fronta-v-ere-bespilotnyh-operaciy

[9] https://www.wsj.com/world/musks-spacex-restricts-starlink-for-russian-drones -766133e4?st=BWZV7B

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DECEMBER 2025

• In December, the trend of saturation in the number of Shahed-type UAV launches, which had been ongoing since the beginning of autumn, continued. Specifically, 5,131 Shahed-type drones were launched in December, of which 3,065 were designated as strike drones, and the remaining drones were categorized as decoy drones. Furthermore, this is the lowest figure recorded since the onset of autumn. The mean frequency of Shahed drone launches in December was approximately 166 per day. This figure approximates the mean number of Shahed drone launches during the summer and fall of 2025, which was 175 UAVs per day, with a peak in July, when the mean was 203 drones per day (see Fig. 1 and Table 1).
• To summarize, it can be stated that since the onset of summer 2025, the quantity of Shahed drones has remained approximately constant at 5,340 per month, with a maximum of 6,297 in July. This suggests the potential for production saturation or constrained supplies of essential components.
• Presently, there has been an observed increase in the relative number of Shahed-type drones that are equipped with online video cameras and radio modems, as compared to the total number of such UAVs. The implementation of such an upgrade necessitates the utilization of specialized equipment and the presence of operators who have undergone the requisite training to effectively control Shahed-type drones. This phenomenon may also be one of the factors contributing to the observed limitation in the growth of the total number of launches.
• Since September 8, official sources have initiated the publication of the approximate number of Shahed/Geran strike drones in the total number of launches. As demonstrated in Table 1, the mean number of Shahed/Geran strike drones in the final quarter of 2025 approximates 60% of the aggregate number (58% in October, 62% in November, and 60% in December) of drones launched.
  • This finding is consistent with our earlier estimates and facilitates the calculation of the number of Shahed/Geran strike drones produced in Alabuga.
  • Concurrently, it is noteworthy that in mass attacks, the proportion of strike UAVs in the total number of launches typically diminishes, while in targeted attacks with a limited number of UAVs, the percentage of strike UAVs can reach 80% (see Figure 2).
• A decrease in the total number of Shahed drone launches was observed in December (5,131) compared to November (5,447). However, the absolute number of successful hits in December (886) is higher than in November (826) and ranks second after October (989) for all periods (see Fig. 3). The efficacy of strikes in December was 17.27%, which is the third highest monthly figure for all of 2025 (see Table 1).

Firstly, it should be emphasized that the main purpose of decoy drones, despite some of them being equipped with small cumulative munitions, is to distract attention and exhaust air defense systems, as well as to conduct video reconnaissance. To assess the effectiveness of strikes, it is imperative to consider not all launched UAVs of the Shahed type, but specifically the strike-type models, such as the Shahed-136/131, Geran2-3, and Harpy 1A. The following assessments will be provided: overall effectiveness and the effectiveness of hits by the strike UAVs (in parentheses).

As demonstrated in Table 1, the average percentage of hits relative to the total number of Shahed-type UAV launches (both strike and decoy drones) exhibited a marked increase from 2-3% in January-February to 9% in March. Since April 2025, this figure has further elevated, ranging from 11.5% to 18.7%, and in terms of the number of strike UAV launches, from 19.5% to 32.3%, respectively. In December, these figures were 17.27% total and 28.21% strike-type UAVs, respectively.

It is noteworthy that during certain attacks, particularly those of a large scale and those that penetrated deep into Ukrainian territory, the relative effectiveness exhibited a decline to 5% total (8% strike UAVs). Conversely, during attacks involving 100–200 drones per day, the effectiveness ranged from 40% to 50% (70%–80%). A notable illustration of this phenomenon occurred on August 9, 2025, when the effectiveness surged remarkably to an exceptional 66%.

In December, the maximum hit rate relative to the total number of UAVs launched was 45% on December 11. However, when only strike UAVs are considered, the maximum effectiveness was achieved on December 17 and amounted to 72.5%, as shown in Figures 4.a and 4b. These features must be considered when assessing the effectiveness of strikes by Shahed-type UAVs.

At the same time, as demonstrated in Figure 4, Shahed-type UAVs generally exhibit the lowest hit efficiency during mass attacks. In rare instances, this efficiency can also be low during attacks involving a limited number of UAVs. The following is a list of the lowest effectiveness of hits in December:

• 9.2% on December 5-6, with a total number of launches of 653 (20% of 300 strike UAVs);
• 17.8% on December 12-13, with a total number of launches of 460 (10.3% of 270 strike UAVs);
• 7.3% on December 13-14, with a total number of launches of 138 (11.76% of 85 strike UAVs);
• 6.1% on December 22-23, with a total number of launches of 635 (9.75% of 400 strike UAVs); and
• 4.8% on December 26-27, with a total number of launches of 519 (8.33% of 300 strike UAVs).

As noted in the analysis by @ShahedTracker[1], most strikes are concentrated in Kyiv and the adjacent Russian-occupied territory. At the same time, four combined massive attacks in December 2025 focused primarily on energy infrastructure in various regions of Ukraine (see Fig. 5).

Conclusions on the Increase in Effectiveness

Offensives comprising a substantial number of Shahed-type UAVs (>400) are predominantly components of integrated attacks encompassing diverse categories of missiles (refer to Figure 5). These occurrences manifest 4-5 times per month, commencing in the summer of 2025, apart from August, where it was 3 times (refer to Figure 1). In these attacks, they serve a dual purpose: to hit targets, but more importantly, to exhaust Ukraine's air defenses, thereby increasing the effectiveness of missiles, which are significantly more expensive.

A thorough examination of the statistics and geography of strikes involving Shahed-type UAVs reveals the primary factors contributing to the enhanced effectiveness of these strikes within Ukrainian territory:

• First, the proximity of the strike areas to the front line or the Ukrainian border (e.g., Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, etc.) reduces flight time and allows for more efficient route planning.
• Secondly, recent advancements in navigation systems, particularly the incorporation of 16‑element CRPA antennas, have enhanced the capacity to counteract Ukrainian electronic warfare systems.
• Thirdly, the integration of online cameras and modems facilitates real-time adjustment of flight trajectories and evasive maneuvers.

There has been an increase in reports of the use of Shahed/Geran jet-powered strike drones, which are much more difficult to neutralize than conventional Shahed‑136/131 drones. However, there have been reports of their successful interception by Ukrainian Sting interceptor drones.[2]

The most salient factor is the constant use of many Shahed-type drones, which rapidly deplete air defense resources. To address this challenge, it is imperative to fortify countermeasures and foster the development of Ukrainian capabilities to counter these threats, including the deployment of interceptor drones. Additionally, it is crucial to augment the supply of Western air defense systems to Ukraine to effectively combat the threat posed by drones.

Figure 1. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during June through December 2025.

Table 1. Detailed statistics of the launches, interceptions and hits of the Shahed-type UAVs in 2025.

Figure 2. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed+Geran vs total number of strike+decoy UAVs in September through December 2025.

Figure 3. Monthly Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during 2025.

Figure 4a. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the total Shahed-type UAVs in September through December 2025.

Figure 4b. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type strike UAVs in September through December 2025.

Figure 5. Maps of the movement of air units (missiles and Shahed-type UAVs) over Ukrainian territory at the massive combined attacks. Source: @monitoringwar, https://t.me/monitoringwar and https://t.me/StrategicaviationT

[2] https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1995043510597333457?s=20

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• Contrary to predictions by some experts and officials of a substantial increase in production and attacks using large numbers of Shahed-type drones in the fall, 5,447 Shahed-type drones were launched in November, of which 3,355 were designated as strike drones. The average frequency of Shahed-type drone launches was approximately 182 per day. This figure approximates the mean number of Shahed-type drone launches during the summer and fall of 2025, which was 176 UAVs per day, with a peak in July, averaging 203 drones per day (see Fig. 1 and Table 1).
  • Consequently, since the onset of summer 2025, the number of Shahed-type drones has remained approximately constant at 5,375 per month, which may suggest production saturation or constrained supplies of essential components.
• A recent and significant increase has been observed in the number of Shahed-type drones equipped with online video cameras and radio modems in the skies over Ukraine. The implementation of such an upgrade necessitates the usage of specialized equipment and the presence of operators who have undergone the requisite training to effectively control Shahed-type drones. This phenomenon may also be a contributing factor to the observed limitation in the growth of the total number of launches.
• Since September 8, official sources have begun to publish the approximate number of Shahed/Geran strike drones in the total number of launches. As illustrated in Table 1, the mean number of Shahed/Geran strike drones in the fall of 2025 approximates 59 percent of the total number (58 percent in September-October, 62 percent in November) launched. This finding aligns with our prior estimations and facilitates the calculation of the number of Shahed/Geran drones produced in Alabuga.
  • Concurrently, it is noteworthy that during the initial phase of November, the proportion of strike UAVs was approximately 64 percent, while in the latter half of November, it exhibited a modest decline to 59 percent (refer to Figure 2).
• Notwithstanding the rise in the aggregate number of Shahed-type drone launches in November (5447) relative to October (5298), the absolute number of successful attacks in November ranks second (826) after October (989) (see Fig. 3). The effectiveness of strikes in November was 15.16 percent, while in October it was 18.7 percent, which is the highest monthly figure observed for all periods (see Table 1).

As illustrated in Table 1, starting in April 2025, the mean percentage of on-target hits is projected to range from 11.5 percent to 18.7 percent. It is noteworthy that during certain attacks, particularly those of a massive scale and those targeting deep within Ukraine, the relative effectiveness decreased to 5–8 percent. In contrast, during attacks involving 100–200 drones per day, the effectiveness rate ranged from 40 percent to 50 percent. A notable illustration of this phenomenon occurred on August 9, 2025, when the effectiveness surged to an extraordinary 66 percent. In November, the maximum recorded damage rates were 46.38 percent on November 9 and 49.58 percent on November 11, as illustrated in Figure 4.

In contrast, as illustrated in Figure 4, the Shahed-type UAVs demonstrated their lowest levels of effectiveness in November during instances of mass attacks. The effectiveness of these UAVs was recorded as follows:

• 11.35 percent on November 8, with a total number of launches of 458;
• 5.35 percent on November 14, with a total number of launches of 430;
• 7.14 percent on November 19, with a total number of launches of 476;
• 5.6 percent on November 25, with a total number of launches of 464; and
• 5.87 percent on November 29, with a total number of launches of 596.

It is important to note that attacks involving a significant number of Shahed-type drones (>400) are commonly part of combined attacks involving various types of missiles (see Fig.5), which occur every 5-7 days in the fall of 2025 (see Fig.1). Consequently, they serve a dual role, both striking targets and contributing to the depletion of Ukraine's air defense, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the missiles, which are significantly more expensive.

As noted in the analysis by @ShahedTracker[1], most strikes are concentrated in Kyiv and the adjacent Russian-occupied territory. Of the five such combined massive attacks in November 2025, three were concentrated exclusively on Kyiv, one on Kyiv and the Poltava region (gas exploration), and one on the western part of Ukraine (see Fig. 5).

• First, the proximity of the strike areas to the front line or the Ukrainian border (e.g., Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, etc.) reduces flight time and allows for more efficient route planning.
• Secondly, recent advancements in navigation systems, particularly the incorporation of 16‑element CRPA antennas, have enhanced the capacity to counteract Ukrainian electronic warfare systems.
• Thirdly, the integration of online cameras and modems facilitates real-time adjustment of flight trajectories and evasive maneuvers.

There has been an increase in reports of the use of Shahed/Geran jet-powered strike drones, which are much more difficult to neutralize than conventional Shahed‑136 drones. However, there have been reports of their successful interception by Ukrainian Sting interceptor drones.[2]

The most salient factor is the constant use of a large number of Shahed-type drones, which rapidly depletes air defense resources. In order to address this challenge, it is imperative to fortify countermeasures and foster the development of Ukrainian capabilities to counter these threats, including the deployment of interceptor drones. Additionally, it is crucial to augment the supply of Western air defense systems to Ukraine to effectively combat the threat posed by drones.

Figure 1. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during June-November 2025.

Table.1 Detailed statistics of the launches, interceptions and hits of the Shahed-type UAVs in 2025.

Figure 2. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed+Geran strike drones vs total number of strike+decoy UAVs in Oct.-Nov. 2025.

Figure 4. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during the autumn of 2025.

[2] https://x.com/sternenko/status/1995041720682303562?s=20

OCTOBER 2025

• Despite the anticipation of some experts and officials regarding a substantial escalation in Shahed attacks during the fall season, the observed frequency of Shahed drone launches in October amounted to approximately 171 per day. This figure approximates the number of launches recorded in June and September, with an average of 181 and 188 launches per day, respectively. The observed frequency of Shahed drone launches in October exceeded that of August, which averaged 133 per day due to a decline in attacks during the initial 20 days of August, yet fell short of the peak observed in July, with an average of 203 drones per day (see Fig.1 and Table 1).
  • Consequently, since the onset of summer 2025, the number of Shahed drones has remained approximately constant at 5,500 per month, which may indicate either production saturation or limited supplies of key components.
• Recently, there has been a notable increase in the presence of Shahed-like UAVs equipped with online video cameras and radio modems in the skies over Ukraine. The implementation of such an upgrade necessitates the utilization of specialized equipment and the presence of operators who have undergone the requisite training to effectively manage Shahed-type UAVs. This phenomenon may also be a contributing factor to the observed limitation in the growth of the total number of launches.
• Since September 8, official sources have begun to publish the approximate number of Shahed/Geran UAVs in the total number launched. As can be seen from Table 1, the average number of Shahed/Geran strike drones is approximately 58% of the total number. This coincides with the estimates we provided earlier and allows us to estimate the number of Shahed/Geran drones produced in Alabuga. If we take the value of 58%, then in October, approximately 3, 063 Shahed/Geran drones were launched.
  • At the same time, it should be noted that in the first half of October the number of Strike UAVs was about 55% but in the second half of October it became 65% (See Fig. 2).
• Despite a decline in the aggregate number of Shahed-like launches in October compared to previous periods (June, July, and September), the absolute number of successful attacks in October was higher (see Fig. 3). The efficacy of strikes in October was 18.7%, representing the highest monthly rate observed across all periods (see Table 1).

As illustrated in Table 1, beginning in April 2025, the mean number of successful hits on the target is estimated to be between 12% and 18%. It is noteworthy that during certain attacks, particularly those of a mass scale and those that penetrated deep into Ukrainian territory, the relative effectiveness exhibited a decline reaching 5–8%. Conversely, in relatively smaller attacks, involving 100–200 drones per day, the effectiveness levels attained a range of 40–50%. A notable instance that exemplifies this phenomenon occurred on August 9, 2025, where the effectiveness surged to an exceptional 66%, as illustrated in Figure 4.

As noted in the analysis by @ShahedTracker (https://x.com/ShahedTracker), most strikes are concentrated in Kyiv and the adjacent Russian-occupied territory. Consequently, the efficacy of strikes may be enhanced due to the following factors: first, the proximity of strike areas to the front line or the Ukrainian border (e.g., Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, etc.), which results in reduced flight times and more efficient route planning; second, the recent advancements in navigation systems, specifically the adoption of 16-element CRPA antennas, which enhance the ability to counter Ukrainian electronic warfare systems; and third, the integration of online cameras and modems, which enables the real-time adjustment of flight trajectories and the execution of maneuvers to evade targeting.

There has also been an increase in reports regarding the deployment of Shahed/Geran jet-powered strike drones, which poses a significantly greater challenge to neutralize in comparison to conventional Shahed-136 UAVs.

Of primary importance is the persistent utilization of substantial numbers of Shahed-type drones, which are rapidly depleting air defense resources. This necessitates the enhancement of countermeasures and the augmentation of the provision of Western air defense systems to counter drones.

Figure 1. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during June-October 2025.

Figure 2. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed+Geran vs total number of strike+decoy UAVs in October 2025.

Figure 4. Statistics of the Hits vs Launches of the Shahed-type UAVs during the summer-autumn of 2025.

SEPTEMBER 2025

• After a decline in the number of attacks in the first 20 days of August, the number of attacks increased in September (see Figure 1) and now stands at approximately 188 Shahed-type drones per day, close to the figures for June (an average of 181 drones per day) and July (an average of 203 drones per day).
• The average monthly number of drones for the period June through September does not show any increase, amounting to about 5400 drones per month, possibly indicating either production saturation or limited supplies of key components.
• Since September 8, official Ukrainian sources have begun to publish the approximate number of Shahed/Geran drones in the total number launched (except for cases of mass attacks of 400-600 drones per day). Figure 2 shows that the average number of Shahed/Geran strike drones is approximately 58 percent of the total number. This coincides with the estimates the Institute provided in earlier reports and allows an estimate of the number of Shahed/Geran drones produced at Alabuga. If the value of 58 percent is taken, then in September, approximately 3,250 Shahed/Geran drones were launched.
• Despite the decrease in the total number of Shahed launches in August compared to previous periods, the relative number of successful hits was higher in August. In September, the effectiveness of the strikes was close to that of June (the number of drones launched was also similar in these two months).

As can be seen from Table 1, starting in April 2025, the average number of hits on the target is approximately 12 to 18 percent. During some attacks (especially massive ones and attacks deep into Ukrainian territory), relative effectiveness drops to 5–8 percent, and sometimes reaches 30–40 percent (see Figure 3). In fact, as noted in the analysis by @ShahedTracker (https://x.com/ShahedTracker), the largest number of hits falls on Kyiv and the territory of Ukraine closest to Russia (the border or the front line). Thus, effectiveness can increase due to the fact that when striking areas close to the front line or the Ukrainian border (Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, etc.), the flight time is shorter, and the routes are better planned. Moreover, recent changes to navigation systems allow the attacking drones to better counter Ukrainian electronic warfare systems and adjust flight trajectories.

There continue to be reports of the use of Shahed/Geran jet-powered strike drones, which fly faster and are more difficult to shoot down than the Shahed-136 type drones.

Nonetheless, the steady use of a large number of Shahed-type drones exhausts air defense resources. This requires increased supplies of Western anti-drone air defense systems.

Figure 1. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type drones, aka UAVs, during June to September 2025.

Figure 2. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed vs total number of strike+decoy drones in September 2025.

Table 1. Detailed statistics of the launches, interceptions and hits of the Shahed-type drones in 2025.

Figure 3. Statistics of the Hits vs launches of the Shahed-type drones, aka UAVs, during the summer of 2025.

• The first 20 days in August 2025 saw a decrease in the number of Shahed-type drone launches and the absence of large-scale attacks against Ukraine. However, the number of attacks increased sharply a few days after the August 15th summit between Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.
• After the large number of Shahed-type drone attacks in June (181 drones daily average) and especially in July (203 drones daily average), the daily average number during August 1-20 was 88 but by the end of August the daily average had risen to 133.
• It should also be noted that compared to the large peak attacks in July (539, 728, and 597 drones per day), the most massive attack in early August involved only 162 drones but in the last 10 days of August the massive attacks resumed (574, 598 and 537 drones per day).

The relative decrease in the number of drones launched against Ukraine may be due to many factors, including:

• Ukraine's attacks on component manufacturing in Russia (especially navigation equipment), problems with the supply chain for components, and preparations for some kind of super-strike.
  • However, many also believe that Putin decided to reduce the intensity of attacks ahead of the summit with Trump, while simultaneously building up forces for strikes after the meeting. This view was confirmed by statistics on attacks shortly after the summit ended.
  • Another reason for the decrease may be related to youth workers at the plant, the “summer vacation” of Alabuga Polytechnic students and scandals related to the exposure of the use of foreign young women in the production of drones.
  • And finally, the lower number of launches in August may also be related to the modernization of Shahed/Geran + Gerbera/Parodia drones and their equipping with new electronics to expand their functionality, for example:
    • Role splitting and adaptation to “wolf pack” tactics.
    • The latest “innovation” is installing video cameras and modems so that strike drones, which are preprogrammed, have possibilities to be guided online, and drones that previously only served as decoys are now also used as reconnaissance drones deep inside Ukrainian territory.

Increased Effectiveness of Russian Shahed Strikes

Despite the decrease in the total number of Shahed launches in August compared to previous periods, the relative number of successful hits was higher in August. This may be because in August, Russia focused on strikes on territory close to the front line or the Ukrainian border (Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, etc.), where the Shahed drones do not fly long distances throughout Ukraine. This is clearly visible in the graph: during the most massive attacks in June-July, the relative effectiveness of strikes was very low, sometimes around 3 percent.

There are increasing reports of the use of Shahed/Geran jet-powered strike drones, which are much more difficult to shoot down than the usual Shahed-136 type drones.

In fact, as noted in the analysis by @ShahedTracker (https://x.com/ShahedTracker) the largest number of hits falls on Kyiv and the territory of Ukraine, which is close to Russia (the border or the front line).

The improved effectiveness of strikes in August may also be related to the fact that the Russians, as detailed in the report of @Tomasz Darmolinski (published in LinkedIn), began to use “Wolfpack” tactics. This “Wolfpack” tactic is vividly illustrated in Ukrainian Telegram channels, which track the direction of attacks in detail and report on the approaching drones.

Figure 1. Statistics of the launches of the Shahed-type drones during the summer 2025.

Figure 2. Statistics of the Hits vs launches of the Shahed-type drones during the summer 2025.

Figure 3. An example of grouping Shahed-type UAVs during one of the attacks. Source: https://t.me/war_monitor/32002