Toplines

Russia conducted a devastating missile and drone strike, including with an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), against Ukraine, heavily targeting Kyiv City, on the night of May 23 to 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 90 missiles, including 36 ballistic missiles, and 600 drones against Ukraine overnight — the largest missile strike against Ukraine thus far in 2026.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one IRBM (very likely meaning the Oreshnik IRBM); two Kinzhal hypersonic missiles; three Zircon hypersonic missiles; 30 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 surface-to-air missiles; 54 Kh-101/Iskander-K/Kalibr cruise missiles; and 600 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 55 missiles and 549 drones, that 16 missiles and 51 drones struck 54 locations, and that debris fell on 23 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force added that an additional 19 missiles likely did not reach their targets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Kyiv City, including three missiles against a water supply facility, an Oreshnik against Bila Tserkva, and other strikes against civilian and residential infrastructure.[2] Russia notably used an Oreshnik against Kyiv City for the first time — Russia launched Oreshniks against Dnipro City in November 2024 and Lviv City in early 2026.[3] The footage of Russia’s Oreshnik strike against Kyiv City showed six submunition clusters of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) with each cluster carrying six kinetic rods.[4] The footage appears to show some submunitions approaching their target in a different strike pattern than how the Oreshnik submunitions struck Lviv. Russian forces may have conducted the Oreshnik strike to test and refine their nuclear weapons delivery systems, with one source reporting that the Oreshnik used kinetic energy projectiles in place of a conventional explosive payload.[5] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes killed at least four and injured at least 100 civilians, including killing at least two and injuring at least 81 in Kyiv City alone.[6] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also targeted Poltava, Kirovohrad, Kharkiv, Kropyvnytskyi, Odesa, Sumy, Zhytomyr, and Cherkasy oblasts.[7]

Russian strikes damaged government buildings and cultural sites in Kyiv City, as the Kremlin threatened it would if Ukraine struck Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations in Moscow City, which Ukraine did not strike. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, the Cabinet of Ministers building, and the National Art Museum, and destroyed the Chornobyl Museum and Lukianivskyi market.[8] The Kremlin previously threatened to strike “decision-making” centers in Kyiv City, including with an Oreshnik, if Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Russia’s Victory Day celebrations, which Ukraine did not do.[9] The Kremlin threatened to use Oreshniks in the days leading up to Victory Day, likely intended to obfuscate Russia’s weakness and its inability to reliably defend large portions of Russia’s airspace from Ukrainian deep rear strikes. The Russian strike against Kyiv City is part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continued effort to erase his Victory Day parade humiliation, as Putin tries to project strength after his widely criticized parade. Russia’s strike completely violates the spirit of the three-day Victory Day ceasefire, which Ukraine abided by, and demonstrates Putin’s unfaithfulness to any agreements that do not heavily favor him.

Russian forces are increasingly using mass Shahed drone strikes to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses to facilitate successful missile strikes amidst high Ukrainian Shahed interception rates. Ukrainian forces intercepted 91.5 percent of all drones, 36.7 percent of Iskander-M and S-300 ballistic missiles, and 81.5 percent of cruise missiles in Russia’s overnight strike.[10] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported that Ukraine’s Shahed drone interception rate exceeded the six-month average and that drone interceptors downed over 40 percent of all intercepted Shaheds.[11] Beskrestnov also stated that the Russian combined strike package included jet-powered Geran-3 and Geran-4 drones and noted that the flight pattern and a relatively low number of remote-controlled Shaheds indicate that Russian forces intended to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses before launching the missiles. Russian forces have previously launched a massive number of drones, for which Ukrainian forces have a high interception rate, over an extended period of time, before launching ballistic missiles, which Ukrainian forces struggle to intercept.[12] Russia’s combined strike package included the most missiles since December 2024, taking advantage of the global Patriot interceptor missile shortage since Ukraine relies on Patriot systems to intercept ballistic missiles.[13]

Russian nationalist milbloggers dismissed the strikes as mostly symbolic and noted that the strikes come amidst Russian failures on the battlefield. Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the May 24 strikes as expensive but not militarily useful and that the Oreshnik strike against Bila Tserkva did not have a clear militarily significant target.[14] Milbloggers further criticized the strikes as expensive and as not contributing to the Russian war effort, while Russian forces are under-resourced and unable to advance on the frontline.[15] One milblogger argued that the Russian military command is wrong to prioritize expensive strikes given Russian forces’ lack of sufficient first-person view (FPV) drones on the frontline, which is enabling Ukraine to achieve a larger number of FPV drones and advance.[16] Another Russian milblogger argued that Ukrainian forces are successfully striking Russian logistics targets in occupied Ukraine, and that Russian strikes on Kyiv will not be able to prevent Ukraine from continuing these strikes.[17] Russian forces are performing poorly on the battlefield and failing to make operationally significant advances in their ongoing spring-summer 2026 campaign, as Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack and comprehensively strike Russian mid–range targets and deep in the Russian rear.[18] Russian military leadership may have struck Kyiv City in a futile attempt to distract from Russian battlefield failures and project strength and power to both a domestic and international audience.

Russia’s justification for the combined strike on Kyiv City contradicts Russia’s long-term practice of deliberate targeting of civilians. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces launched Oreshnik, Iskander, Kinzhal, and Zirkon missiles against Ukraine overnight in response to Ukrainian “terrorist attacks” and civilian targets in Russia.[19] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on May 24 that the Russian strikes against Ukraine were Russia’s response to a Ukrainian strike that purportedly killed children, referring to a Ukrainian strike on occupied Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast, on May 22.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 22 that Ukrainian forces had struck a headquarters of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies near occupied Starobilsk, which Russian officials claimed was a dormitory of the Starobilsk Pedagogical College.[21] ISW is unable to verify reports on the target of the Ukrainian strike. Russian forces regularly strike civilian targets across Ukraine and have widely weaponized civilian harm as an intentional tool of war.[22] Russian accusations of a supposed Ukrainian strike on civilians conflict with the Russian practice of intentionally striking civilians and adapting military tactics and actions that deliberately maximize civilian harm.

Key Takeaways

• Russia conducted a devastating missile and drone strike, including with an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), against Ukraine, heavily targeting Kyiv City, on the night of May 23 to 24.
• Russian strikes damaged government buildings and cultural sites in Kyiv City, as the Kremlin threatened it would if Ukraine struck Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations in Moscow City, which Ukraine did not strike.
• Russian forces are increasingly using mass Shahed drone strikes to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses to facilitate successful missile strikes amidst high Ukrainian Shahed interception rates.
• Russian nationalist milbloggers dismissed the strikes as mostly symbolic and noted that the strikes come amidst Russian failures on the battlefield.
• Russia’s justification for the combined strike on Kyiv City contradicts Russia’s long-term practice of deliberate targeting of civilians.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and the Hulyaipole direction.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on the night of May 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 24 that Ukrainian forces struck the oil loading berth at the Tamanneftegaz Oil Terminal in Volna, Krasnodar Krai.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the terminal is a key Russian oil export facility in the Black Sea area with a capacity to support the transshipment of up to 20 million tons of oil per year. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Project 1135M Krivak-II class patrol ship Pytlivy and a hovercraft missile boat at the Novorossiysk Naval Base in Krasnodar Krai. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on May 24 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Vtorovo linear production and dispatching station in Vladimir Oblast, causing a fire.[24] The SBU reported that the station is a hub for petroleum product pipelines and pumps raw materials from oil refineries in central Russia to export ports and domestic consumers. The SBU reported, and Vladimir Oblast governor Alender Avdeev acknowledged on May 24, that the strike resulted in an 800 square meter fire.[25]

Sabotage activity continues to damage Russian military assets. A Russian monitoring source reported on May 23 that members of the “Kuban Insurgent Movement” set off a large-scale fire at a military camp of the 960th Assault Aviation Regiment (4th Composite Aviation Division, 4th Guards Air and Air Defense Forces Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) near Primorsk-Akhtarsk airfield in Krasnodar Krai.[26] The Main Directorate of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia for Krasnodar Krai acknowledged on May 22 a fire on the grounds of a military unit near Primorsk-Akhtarsk.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 24 but did not advance.[28]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against military assets in Russian border oblasts on the night of May 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Tetkino and a manpower concentration near Volfinsky in Kursk Oblast.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Borisovka, Belgorod Oblast.[30] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel reported on May 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a training ground of a Russian Akhmat spetsnaz battalion of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia).[31]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 24 but did not advance.[32]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk on May 24.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River

Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 24 but did not advance.[34] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on May 24 that Russian forces are increasingly using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles to attack in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR).[35]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 24 but did not advance.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Novoplatonivka (north of Borova).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that both Russian and Ukrainian forces maintain positions within Novoplatonivka and that Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova) is a contested gray zone.[38]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of May 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a material and technical equipment warehouse, an ammunition warehouse, and a fuel and lubricants warehouse near occupied Biloutsk (roughly 85 kilometers from the frontline).[39] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on May 24 that Ukrainian forces also struck Russian deployment points, a drone repair base, an occupation police station, and Russian equipment and fuel depots in occupied Luhansk City (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline), Kadiivka (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline), and Bilokurakyne (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline), and Sievierodonetsk and Svatove raions.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 24 but did not advance.[41]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area as Russian forces conducted infiltration missions. Geolocated footage published on May 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[42] Geolocated footage published on May 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in the southern and southwestern outskirts of Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration mission.[43] Geolocated footage published on May 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember operating west of Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assess was a Russian infiltration mission.[44] ISW assesses that this event did not occur within the last 24 hours.

A Russian milblogger claimed on May 24 that Russian vehicles quickly get clogged with mud on the frontline in the Kostyantynivka direction.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on May 24 but did not advance.[46]

Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration missions in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage posted on May 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember west of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[47] A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported May 24 that Russian forces are increasing pressure in the Pokrovsk direction as they continue small group infiltration missions to accumulate troops behind Ukrainian positions.[48] The servicemember reported that Russian forces are relying on a large number of drones to conduct battlefield air interdiction (BAI) of Ukrainian logistics.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Vasylivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced southwest of Vasylivka.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on May 24 but did not advance.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a drone control point near occupied Voskresenka (east of Oleksandrivka).[51]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Ukrainian forces either recently advanced or maintained positions amid Russian infiltration missions in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on May 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in eastern Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole), where ISW had previously assessed that Russian forces were conducting infiltration missions.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 24 but did not advance.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 24 that Russian forces face a deteriorating situation in Stepnohirsk (northwest of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[54]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces reported on May 23 that Ukrainian forces struck two fuel trucks near occupied Preslav and Azvoske (approximately 93 and 95 kilometers from the frontline, respectively), a Tigr infantry mobility vehicle near occupied Azovske, and a vehicle near occupied Kostyantynivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (possibly referring to occupied Kostyantynivka, Zaporizhia Oblast near occupied Melitopol, roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline).[55] Geolocated footage published on May 24 shows a destroyed Russian fuel truck along the M-14 Prymorsk-Berdyansk highway near occupied Azovske after a Ukrainian strike.[56]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on May 24 but did not advance.[57]

Ukrainian forces continued their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Russian military logistics in occupied Crimea on the night of May 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 24 that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition storage facility in occupied Mizhhirya (approximately 220 kilometers from the frontline).[58]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[2] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19184

[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024/

[4] https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/2058364895779832127/video/1

[6] https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/6713 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19197; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2058522855550124457

[7] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/na-miscyah-rosijskih-udariv-po-kiyevu-v-nich-na-24-travnya-p-104573

[8] https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/2058454191140377036?s=46&t=JHHzChDbvSf3JHpnTV6Hcg ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19186; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/kulturni-pamyatky-kyyeva-ataky-rosiyi/; https://www.facebook.com/MCSCUkraine/posts/pfbid02jZUz49GXCpkxv6zNnVgKjVRmniXvm73yttkmBokFRzf5Tu456A7X7G2fGQFqw9XQl?__cft__[0]=AZbTXNEILugc38NmFcDkC7iQ1hLqARdE0auQvElqlEpjoWHSH_wOIO7qLMZ1vF9Kwf6X0O5E6L6eFly1a_4aUNSwOdDd-xMCPoK_DwFYvyGW9awubIPNmjlMb0iz6_bNW8WHUq_khXAz8NY6SaF5cvo_&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/zapovidnyk2018/posts/pfbid02pv5SBmNfKu41RWUboenQYGxFByguQJk8Vc8d5DEGroJEHL3x6BKV4jHayA5JF8o4l?__cft__[0]=AZYd4IiB6258urMFDLm83wi-NhJIJ8bWtfF76syWdVS2Vl5Oi8orAAtW09RvaEstd1OsqkHkpr3A4LINuG6cl3oM94UQlKrVLVJ6dhhc4cKBh3SYbBPpXXDPyCIm7rKRtaDDJpTB1AXlAhCPubGCzj9o&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://x.com/Svyrydenko_Y/status/2058473560390209548?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E2058473560390209548%7Ctwgr%5E0fcb97003287bdac2c1b2a931b104659293943e2%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fsuspilne.media%2F1314871-kabmin-9%2F ; https://suspilne dot media/1314871-kabmin-9/

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2026/

[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2026/

[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/

[14] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72480; https://t.me/dva_majors/93415; https://t.me/romanov_92/53405; https://t.me/rybar/80536; https://t.me/motopatriot78/52120; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72470; https://t.me/milinfolive/172864; https://t.me/motopatriot78/52135; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72470

[15] https://t.me/motopatriot78/52135; https://t.me/motopatriot78/52120; https://t.me/milinfolive/172934

[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/;

[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2026/

[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2026/

[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39055;

[25] https://max dot ru/avdeev_o_vazhnom/AZ5ZV25sLDg; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/27512115; https://t.me/SBUkr/17641

[26] https://rusmonitor dot com/kpd-poleznogo-dejstviya.html; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/partyzany-vlashtuvaly-masshtabnu-pozhezhu/; https://t.me/rschs_kuban/1628

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39035 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39037 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39066 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8126 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34398 ; https://t.me/uvkkursk/386

[31] militarnyi dot com/uk/news/syly-oborony-zavdaly-raketnogo-po-ahmat/

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39035 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39037; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20734 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39066 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8126

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39037; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20734 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34398

[35] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1314870-vijskovi-rf-castise-vikoristovuut-mototehniku-na-kupansini-presoficer-33-i-ombr-ak-comu-protidiut-sili-oboroni/; https://suspilne dot media/1314725-rf-zapustila-droni-po-ukraini-zelenskij-zaaviv-pro-mozlivij-udar-oresnikom-1551-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1779632960&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39037; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20734

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39035; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39037; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39066; https://t.me/wargonzo/34398

[42] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/2058502161072611647; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/2058505625047367746; https://t.me/batt_terek/10770

[43] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2058226721699065918; https://www.instagram.com/striga.17csp/reel/DYrHwSUKzdJ/; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2058208419048194128; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2058228729969508783; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2058228733450858516; https://www.instagram.com/striletskiy_police_batt/reel/DYrh3RYIlSy/

[44] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2058548954468344026; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2058548939960246529; https://facebook.com/reel/1022289763876554; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12006

[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39035; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39037; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39066

[47] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11997; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2395

[48] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1313713-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-rosiani-atakuut-motociklami-i-dronami-voin-42-ombr/

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39035; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39037; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39066; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14064; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14067; https://t.me/voin_dv/19609

[52] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2058174988281086371?s=20; https://t.me/voin_dv/19604

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39035; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39037; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14064; https://t.me/wargonzo/34398

[55] https://t.me/usf_army/1971; https://suspilne dot media/1314725-rf-zapustila-droni-po-ukraini-zelenskij-zaaviv-pro-mozlivij-udar-oresnikom-1551-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1779632088

[56] https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2058236033045496231; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2058447059209138638